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NOTES
RACE, SEX, AND GENETIC DISCRIMINATION IN
INSURANCE: WHAT'S FAIR'
INTRODUCTION
What's fair? Only a philosopher or a lexicographer could begin
to answer this question in the abstract. But consider its application in
the following contexts:
(1) Ed, a fifty-year-old black man, applies for life insurance in
order to provide financial security for his family. The insurance com-
pany offers Ed a policy, but charges him a higher premium than it
charges fifty-year-old white men because statistics show that black men
tend to have shorter life spans than white men.
(2) Carlos, a forty-year-old man, applies for the disability insur-
ance offered by his employer. Because a recent genetic test showed
that he is especially susceptible to a certain degenerative disease, Car-
los must pay almost twice the amount his co-workers pay to receive the
same level of coverage.
(3) Marie, a thirty-year-old woman, and her twin brother George
apply to the same company for health insurance. Because women, on
average, tend to use health care services more frequently than men,
the company charges Marie much more than it charges George for
similar coverage.
All three situations are arguably unfair: Ed, Carlos, and Marie
could each claim that insurers should not be able to classify individu-
als in these ways. Ed would have the law on his side in every state,1
and Carlos could challenge the insurer's decision under the laws of an
increasing number of states. 2 Marie, on the other hand, could appeal
to the laws of only one state.3
I Ed would have a claim under state laws banning "unfair discrimination" or laws
expressly prohibiting the use of race as a classifier. See infra parts I.B.3, IIA.
Here and in the following paragraphs this Note refers to overall trends in the law.
Complexities, to the extent that they are relevant, are discussed in Part II. This Note dis-
cusses only personal lines of insurance (annuities and health, life, disability, auto, property,
and liability insurance). The "fair discrimination" doctrine has not been applied to com-
mercial lines of insurance, because these lines rely on individual assessments of risk for
each insured, rather than hard-and-fast risk classifications.
2 See infra part II.C.
3 Montana is the only state that bans the use of gender as a classifier for every type of
insurance. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-309 (1993). Marie could appeal to federal law, how-
ever, if the health insurance plan was offered through her employer. See infra parts I.B.2,
IE.B.
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This Note seeks to explain this disparity by asking the question:
"What type of insurance discrimination is fair?" The question itself
might seem odd, since the term "discrimination" is normally used pe-
joratively. But in the context of insurance, "discrimination is not nec-
essarily bad, equality not necessarily good."4 The laws regulating
insurers' use of classification are called "unfair discrimination"5 laws
because some forms of discrimination do seem to be fair. Most peo-
ple would agree, for instance, that automobile insurers should be able
to "discriminate" against those who have been convicted for drunk
driving or otherwise have poor driving records by charging them
higher premiums.
The debate among scholars over more controversial types of in-
surance classification has polarized into two dominant perspectives:6
the efficient discrimination perspective and the anti-discrimination
perspective. 7 Under the former, it would be fair to charge Ed, Marie,
and Carlos higher insurance rates, because race, sex, and genetic fac-
tors are statistically correlated to higher risks of loss.8 Under the lat-
ter, it would not be fair to charge them higher rates, because people
do not choose their race, their sex, or their genes: these are non-
causal, immutable factors, historically linked to unfair treatment.
The current unfair discrimination laws do not reflect either of
these perspectives in their pure form, since the laws generally allow
4 Herman T. Bailey et al., The Regulatory Challenge to Life Insurance Classfication, 25
DRAKE L. REV. 779, 782 (1976) (emphasis removed).
5 The term comes from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners'
Model Unfair Trade Practices Act, which defines as an unfair trade practice the act of
"[mlaking or permitting any unfair discrimination between individuals of the same class and
equal expectation of life in the rates charged... benefits payable... or in any of the other
terms and conditions of such policy." MODEL UNFAIR TRADE PRAcICES Acr § 4(g)(1)
(Nat'l Ass'n Ins. Comm'rs 1993).
6 Leah Wortham, Insurance Classification: Too Important to Be Left to the Actuaries, 19 U.
MICH.J.L. REF. 349, 350 (1986). Wortham argues that the insurance classification debate
should include two "overlooked perspectives": (1) "an appreciation that insurance is a ne-
cessity for most Americans" and (2) an understanding that selection competition in the
insurance market deflects insurers away from forms of competition that might achieve re-
duced overhead, improved service, and innovative products. Id. at 350-51. This Note will
argue that Wortham's first "overlooked perspective" has actually played an important role
in the insurance classification debate; it suggests that this perspective is not so much over-
looked as under-acknowledged. See discussion infra part II.B.2.
7 Commentators have adopted a variety of different terms to describe these two
points of view. Kenneth Abraham, for instance, identifies three types of concerns: "accu-
racy-equity" concerns, "control-causality" concerns, and "suspect variable" concerns. KEN-
NETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBuC Pouc' 83-95
(1986). The first set of concerns informs the efficient discrimination view; the latter two
sets of concerns inform the anti-discrimination view. Wortham actually uses the term "fair
discrimination" rather than "efficient discrimination" to describe the first perspective.
Wortham, supra note 6, at 350. To emphasize that what Wortham terms the "fair discrimi-
nation perspective" is distinct from the set of state "fair discrimination" laws, this Note
employs the term "efficient discrimination" instead.
8 See infra part II.
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sex discrimination, or even require it,9 while forbidding race and ge-
netic discrimination. There are a number of possible explanations for
this disparity. The laws may reflect the outcome of political battles, in
which racial minorities and the "genetically fragile" won, and women
lost. But this explanation is not very satisfying, since political power
does not appear to be distributed this way in our society.
Another explanation is that insurance codes are simply a "rub-
bish heap,"' 0 because "[i]nsurance regulation .. .is more the accre-
tion of specific responses to immediately perceived problems than the
product of ordered efforts to achieve fundamental objectives."" But
this explanation is similarly unsatisfying, since it takes the position
that there is no explanation.
A third explanation is that the laws are in fact "the product of
[our collective] efforts to achieve fundamental objectives."' 2 This ex-
planation is the most interesting because it promises some insight into
the question "what's fair?," at least for this society. But it is also quite
challenging because it is not clear what those fundamental objectives
could be. What sorts of beliefs or concerns would motivate us, as a
society, to forbid race and genetic discrimination in insurance while
allowing sex discrimination? What shared theory of fairness could
produce these results?
This Note presents a theory to explain the current state of insur-
ance discrimination law. In order to construct a coherent theory,
however, this Note must go beyond the limits of the two dominant
perspectives on insurance discrimination. It argues that neither of the
dominant perspectives alone, nor any combination of them, can ade-
quately explain the current state of insurance discrimination law.
Both the efficient discrimination perspective and the anti-dis-
crimination perspective answer the question "what's fair?" by propos-
ing that we have a moral right to be free from unjust discrimination.' 3
From the efficient discrimination perspective, we have a right not to
be classified for insurance purposes unless the classification corre-
sponds to an accurate prediction of risk. From the anti-discrimination
perspective, we have a right not to be classified for insurance purposes
on the basis of unacceptable classifiers such as race, sex, or genetic
9 See infra note 103 and accompanying text (discussing California's law requiring sex
discrimination in insurance).
10 Spencer L. Kimball, Unfinished Business in Insurance Regulation, 1969 Wis. L. REv.
1019, 1019.
I I Robert Works, Whatever's FAIR-Adequacy, Equity, and the Undenriting Prerogative in
Property Insurance Markets, 56 NEB. L. REx'. 445, 446 (1977).
12 Id.
'3 See, e.g., C. Arthur Williams Jr., Unfair Rate Discrimination in Property and Liability
Insurance, in INSURANCE, GOVERNMENT, AND SOCIAL POLICT. STUDIES IN INSURANCE REGULA-
nON 209, 219-24 (Spencer L. Kimball & Herbert S. Denenberg eds., 1969) (discussing
efficient discrimination as a moral concept).
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factors. Each of these is a "negative right"14-a right to be let alone,
rather than a right to be helped. 15
This Note argues that despite our apparent cultural preference
for negative rights, 16 our collective judgment about the fairness of
race, sex, and genetic discrimination in insurance cannot be ex-
plained solely in those terms. Our collective judgment reflects a posi-
tive rights perspective as well: as a society we do believe that everyone
is entitled to receive a certain amount of help, in the form of societal
goods such as health care.
Participants in the debate over the fairness of genetic discrimina-
tion in insurance have used the rhetoric of negative rights to argue in
support of laws forbidding insurers to use genetic factors as classifi-
ers.' 7 But as this Note's analysis will show, no negative rights theory
can adequately explain the differential treatment of race and genetic
discrimination on the one hand, and sex discrimination on the other.
This Note argues that negative rights reasoning has been employed,
not because it reaches the result we collectively desire, but rather be-
cause a rhetoric of positive rights is not politically effective in our neg-
ative-rights-dominated culture. This point is of more than descriptive
relevance, for as long as our rhetoric does not fit our reasoning, we
will be unable to create a society that we can consider fair.
A cautionary comment: as used in this Note, pronouns such as
"we," "us," and "our" refer to the majority of United States citizens.
14 On the distinction between negative and positive rights, see ISAIAH BERLIN, Two
Conepts of Liberty, in FOUR Essms ON LIBERTY 118, 121-34 (1969); D. D. Raphael, Human
Rights, Old and New, in POLITICAL THEORY AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 54, 60-61 (D. D. Raphael
ed., 1967); andJeremy Waldron, Introduction to THEOMES OF PRHTS 1, 11 (Jeremy Waldron
ed., 1984).
15 Cf.Jackson v. City ofJoliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203-04 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984). Writing for the Seventh Circuit, Posner stated:
[T]he Constitution is a charter of negative rather than positive liberties....
The men who wrote the Bill of Rights were not concerned that government
might do too little for the people but that it might do too much to
them.... [T]he difference between harming and failing to help is just the
difference ... between negative liberty-being let alone by the state-and
positive liberty-being helped by the state.
Id.
16 Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1363, 1392 (1984) (noting that
"[i]n our culture, the image of negative rights overshadows that of positive ones").
17 See, e.g.,Joseph M. Miller, Comment, Genetic Testing and Insurance Classification: Na-
tional Action Can Prevent Discrimination Based on the "Luck of the Genetic Draw," 93 Dic. L.
REv. 729, 738-41 (1989) (stating the anti-discrimination arguments against genetic
discrimination).
Scholars, insurers, legislators, journalists, and citizens at large have participated in the
debate, and all of these participants have relied on negative rights rhetoric in constructing
their arguments. See Regina Austin, The Insurance Classification Controversy, 131 U. PA. L.
Rrv. 517, 518 (1983) ("The rhetoric of the [insurance classification] controversy has not
been filtered through and purified into legal discourse.... [The arguments] are con-
structed of common language ....").
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The use of these pronouns is not intended to imply that every individ-
ual agrees, or should agree, with the theory of fairness this Note exam-
ines; rather, the use of these pronouns reflects the Note's central
hypothesis: that the laws permitting or banning race, sex, and genetic
discrimination in insurance arise from widely shared beliefs about fair-
ness. As a hypothesis, this claim is necessarily descriptive rather than
normative. Using this hypothesis, this Note provides an explanation
for the current disparities in "fair discrimination" law. It then con-
cludes with a normative argument concerning the appropriateness of
attempting to make the insurance system more fair by banning ge-
netic discrimination.
Part I explains the economic factors that drive insurers to place
applicants into different risk classifications and the various sources of
law that limit insurers' freedom to do so.' 8 Part II describes current
insurance discrimination law for three types of classifiers: race, sex,
and genetic factors.19 Part III analyzes these laws under the assump-
tion that they reflect a societal consensus about fairness and argues
that only a theory of fairness that incorporates positive rights can ex-
plain the distinctions between race, sex, and genetic discrimination. 20
Finally, Part IV concludes that laws banning genetic discrimination ac-
tually fail to make the insurance system more fair. If we limit our-
selves to negative rights theories of fairness, we must acknowledge that
genetic factors are acceptable-even ideal-classifiers. If we rely in-
stead on a positive rights theory to explain our desire to ban genetic
discrimination, then we must acknowledge that banning genetic dis-
crimination in insurance is not enough-to avoid hypocrisy, we must
ensure that the benefits of insurance are extended to all.
I
CONSTRAINTS ON CLASSIFICATION
Insurers' classification choices-whether to classify insureds and
by which factors-are limited by both economic and legal constraints.
Part L.A explains the economic constraints that drive individual insur-
ers to use risk classifications. These constraints include competition
among insurers and adverse selection among insureds. Part I.B de-
scribes the legal constraints which prevent insurers from using risk
classifications that we consider to be unfair.
18 See infra notes 21-75 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 76-182 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 183-277 and accompanying text.
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A. Economic Constraints
Insurance developed as a mechanism for distributing the risk of
loss.2 ' It allows the risk averse 22 to shift the burden of unacceptably
large losses. The insurer agrees to assume the insured's risk in ex-
change for a premium equal to the insured's expected loss-the size
of the possible loss multiplied by its probability-plus a small charge
to cover the insurer's overhead costs. The insured benefits by ex-
changing the risk of suffering a large loss for the certainty of suffering
a small one. If the insurer makes adequate calculations, it will not
suffer a loss, since the total losses of its insureds should not exceed the
sum of the premiums they have paid. An insurer who invests the pre-
miums can make a profit.
An insurance system can operate without any classification of in-
sureds if no insurer uses classifications or if there is no competition
among insurers. Nineteenth century life insurance companies pro-
vide an example: each member of these "assessment societies" paid
the same premium, regardless of age, and received the same benefit at
death.2 3 Modem "group insurance," often offered by large employers
to their employees, similarly avoids classifying the risk of each in-
sured.24 In an insurance system without classifications, insurers pool
the expected losses of all of their insureds, with each insured paying a
premium equal to the average expected loss.
Insurers who use risk classifications may do so in three ways: in
underwriting, coverage, or rating.25 Underwriting refers to a prelimi-
nary decision about the insurability of an applicant.26 An insurer
might decide, for example, not to offer its homeowners' insurance
policy to any applicant who has lost two or more dwellings to fire.2 7
Coverage refers to the terms of the insurance contract: What types of
harms are included? How are benefits structured and limited?28 In
21 See genera!/y ABRAHAM, supra note 7, at 1-2 (explaining why insurance systems devel-
oped); ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAw 9-15 (1987) (same).
22 The term "risk averse" refers to a person's attitude toward loss. Given a choice
between a 50% chance of losing $100 and the certainty of losing $50, a risk averse person
would choose to lose $50. A risk preferring person would rather take the 50% chance of
losing $100, while a risk neutral person would have no preference. JERRY, supra note 21, at
11. Many people are generally risk averse, and most people become risk averse as the
magnitude of possible loss increases. Id.
23 E. McCoNNY, OutrrtNE OF THE HISTORY OF LIE INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES
30 (1927). The eventual demise of these societies also provides an example of the effects
of adverse selection by insureds and competition among insurers. See infta notes 36-37 and
accompanying text.
24 JERRY, supra note 21, at 39, 627-39.
25 Wortham, supra note 6, at 354.
26 See ROBERT B. HOLTOM, RESTRAINTS ON UNDERWRITING: RISK SELECTION, DIScRIMINA-
TION AND THE LAW 6-7 (1979).
27 Id. at 10-11.
28 Wortham, sura note 6, at 354 n.19.
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the absence of regulation, for example, insurers may decide that disa-
bility coverage for women will include a longer waiting period and a
lower benefit ceiling.29 Rating assigns different premiums to different
risk groups.3 0 Insurers often decide, for example, that young men
should pay higher premiums for auto insurance than young women.3'
Underwriting, coverage, and rating decisions are based on insur-
ers' predictions about the insureds' possible losses. Such predictions
can never be more than guesses because there is no way to measure
risk directly. Insurers must measure risk indirectly, using loss statistics
that reflect experience with similar risks.32 Underwriting decisions in
particular tend to be made on the basis of very informal loss "statis-
tics"-that is, "[personal] judgment based on experience."33 Regard-
less of the method of measurement, however, the insurer's goal is the
same. Insurers seek to predict each insured's actual risk as accurately
as possible.
Two forces drive insurers to use risk classifications to set rates for
the individual insurance market: adverse selection among insureds
and competition among insurers.34 Adverse selection results from the
insureds' self-interest. Those who expect their losses to be lower than
the losses of others in an insurance pool will tend to leave the pool or
refrain from joining it, while insureds who expect higher losses will
29 Id.; see also Insurance Costs Skyrocketingfor Women, TAMPA TRIBUNE, Jan. 15, 1995, at 5
("The four largest [insurance] carriers justify their [differential treatment of women] with
one simple fact: ... the higher number of disability claims filed by working women . ..
30 Wortham, supra note 6, at 354 n.19.
31 Insurance Costs Skyrocketing for Women, supra note 29.
82 Spencer L. Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A Preliminary Inquiry in the
Theory of Insurance Law, 45 MINN. L. Ray. 471, 495 (1961).
33 HOLTOM, supra note 26, at 2. The author, an experienced underwriter, describes
underwriting as an "art which was passed down from one underwriter to another." Id. at 5.
The author's goal is to explain the factors upon which underwriters have traditionally re-
lied, such as loss history, age, sexual preference, occupation, marital status, and attitude.
He also advises underwriters how to respond to legal restrictions now placed on the use of
some of these factors.
34 Group insurance avoids the pressures of adverse selection and competition,
although insurers may examine the risk of individual insureds in order to calculate the
overall cost of the policy. JERRY, supra note 21, at 634-35. See general!y Bailey et al., supra
note 4 (arguing that adverse selection and competition should be the only constraints on
insurers' classification choices).
Adverse selection and competition affect rating decisions more directly than under-
writing or coverage decisions. However, all three decisions are interrelated. Setting ex-
tremely high rates may have the same effect as choosing not to underwrite or cover a
certain risk (since the insured will then be unable to afford the insurance), while choosing
to underwrite a high-risk individual or to cover a certain risk may raise the sum of an
insurer's expected losses, and thus the insurer's rates. Commentary supporting the anti-
discrimination perspective has focused on the use of classifications for rating, most likely
because insurers now use sex primarily as a rating classifier, rather than as a factor in
underwriting or coverage decisions. See infra part II.B. Underwriting and coverage deci-
sions are more central to the positive rights theory outlined in Part III.B.
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tend to remain in the pool or join it in greater numbers.3 5 To com-
pete, an insurer must capitalize on adverse selection. By defining nar-
row risk categories, an insurer can attract low risk insureds away from
another insurer. Insurers who are unwilling to respond with equally
narrow risk classifications will soon be driven into bankruptcy, as their
losses mount while their premiums stay steady or drop.
The demise of the nineteenth century "assessment societies"
stands as a parable of the power of these economic constraints.36 The
assessment societies' life insurance policies did not rate younger and
older applicants separately; all members paid the same premium. In
pools with a majority of older members, the younger members de-
cided that the premium was not worth paying because it was too much
higher than their actual expected loss. Younger members left the
pools, and as a result, the pools needed to charge higher premiums to
cover the new average expected loss. The higher premiums caused
more members to leave, until finally the premiums became too high
for any member to bear, and the assessment societies collapsed.3 7
Insurers' search for additional risk classifications ends when the
cost of defining and measuring further risk factors exceeds the profit
additional classification would achieve.38 In an ideal market, adverse
selection will drive insurers to create the maximally efficient classifica-
tion system-one in which each insured's premium is equal to his or
her expected loss, to the maximum extent measurable.3 9
B. Legal Constraints
A wide variety of legal constraints could conceivably limit insur-
ers' freedom to use classifiers such as race or sex. Possible legal con-
straints include federal and state constitutional law, federal
regulations, and state regulations. In fact, however, only state regula-
tions have addressed the issue directly.4°
35 ABRAHAM, supra note 7, at 15.
36 See, e.g., McCoNNE-, supra note 23, at 30-37 (recounting the history of the 19th
century "assessment societies" to explain why insurers adopt classification systems); Bailey
et al., supra note 4, at 783-85 (same).
37 Bailey et al., supra note 4, at 783-85.
38 ABRAHAM, supra note 7, at 78; Leah Wortham, The Economics of Insurance Classifica-
tion: The Sound of One Invisible Hand Clapping, 47 OHIo ST. LJ. 835, 846 (1986).
39 See generally AsRAHAM, supra note 7, at 64-100 (discussing risk classification and effi-
ciency). Of course, the ideal market may not exist. Wortham argues that market failures
are pervasive in the insurance industry, and thus that external regulation is necessary.
Wortham, supra note 38, 840-41.
40 See Bailey et al., supra note 4, at 804-23.
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1. Federal and State Constitutional Law
The Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution forbids
states to deny citizens "equal protection of the laws."4' Many state
constitutions contain similarly broad prohibitions, and several have an
Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) specifically prohibiting discrimina-
tory treatment of women or minorities.42 However, because these
provisions only apply if "state action" is involved,43 and because courts
have rejected the idea that even extensive regulation is a form of state
action,44 plaintiffs challenging the legality of insurer classifications on
constitutional grounds have not been successful. 45
2. Federal Statutes
Although Congress has the power to regulate insurance as inter-
state commerce, 46 it has long operated under a policy favoring state-
41 U.S. CONsr. amend. X1V, § 1.
42 See, e.g., WAsH. CONST. art. 31, § 1; see also Phyllis N. Segal, Sexual Equality, the Equal
Protection Clause, and the ERA, 33 Bus. L. REv. 85, 88 (1984) (listing state ERAs).
43 Wortham, supra note 6, at 363. Not all state courts have interpreted their states'
Equal Protection Clauses or Equal Rights Amendments to require state action. SeeBailey et
al., supra note 4, at 821 n.171. However, despite the efforts of NOW and other groups,
there has been no successful court challenge to the use of sex as a classifier.
Some insurance regulators have been able to ban the use of sex as a classifier under
state "unfair discrimination" statutes. In Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Insur-
ance Commissioner, 482 A.2d 542 (Pa. 1984), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that
the state action question was "irrelevant" when a plaintiff insurer challenged the insurance
commissioner's finding that gender-based auto insurance rates were unfairly discrimina-
tory. Id. at 549. The court referred to the state ERA in order to determine that the com-
missioner could reasonably make this finding. Id. Compare Telles v. Commissioner of
Insurance, 574 N.E.2d 359 (Mass. 1991), in which the Massachusetts Supreme Court found
that the Commissioner of Insurance did not have the power under the Massachusetts fair
discrimination statute to forbid the use of gender classification. Id. at 361-62. A concur-
rence in Telles argued that the decision did not foreclose an equal protection challenge to
this and other Massachusetts insurance statutes that seem to allow sex discrimination. Id.
at 363 (Abrams, J., concurring).
Older commentaries on insurance discrimination debate whether state action exists.
See, e.g., Bailey et al., supra note 4, at 810-11. The newer commentaries simply state that
state action is lacking. See, e.g., Stephen R. Kaufman, Comment, Banning "Actuarially
Sound" Discrimination: The Proposed Nondiscrimination in Insurance Act, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
631, 633 n.22 (1983); Wortham, supra note 6, at 363. Case law may be changing in the
opposite direction, especially where state laws seem to require a certain classification. See
CAL. INSUR. CODE § 790.03(f) (West 1993) (mandating sex-based tables for annuities and
life insurance). A 1985 California Attorney General opinion found that this statute vio-
lated federal and state equal protection guarantees, but no court challenge has been suc-
cessful (perhaps because of the practical moomess of the statute, given Title VII's ban on
sex-based employer pension plans).
44 Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350-51 (1974).
45 Wortham, supra note 6, at 363 n.57; see, e.g., Murphy v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co.,
422 A.2d 1097 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (male plaintiff's challenge to sex discrimination in
automobile insurance under Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment fails for lack of state
action), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 896 (1981).
46 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 552-53 (1944).
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level regulations. The 1945 McCarran-Ferguson Act47 established a
presumption of state control over regulation: federal laws are not to
be interpreted as applying to the insurance industry unless Congress
clearly states the purpose of regulating insurance.48 To date, Con-
gress has not passed a statute designed to overcome this
presumption.49
One federal statute has nonetheless had a significant impact on
insurers' ability to classify insureds. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (Title VII)50 makes it unlawful for an employer "to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin."51 In two landmark cases the
Supreme Court applied Title VII to pension plans, which as employer-
sponsored annuities are a type of insurance.5 2 In City of Los Angeles v.
Manhart,53 the Court held that Title VII prohibits an employer from
requiring female employees to contribute more to a pension fund
than their male colleagues in order to receive the same monthly bene-
fits.5 4 In Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris,55 the Court held that
when contributions by men and women to a pension fund are equal,
benefits must also be equal.56
Title VII thus limits an insurer's ability to classify risks when the
insurer's policy is offered through an employer rather than directly to
the public. 57 But Manhart and Norris tell us more about federal er-
47 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1994); seeJER,, supra note 21, at 50.
48 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1994).
49 The Hatfield-Packwood-Dingell bill and the Metzenbaum bill both failed to pass.
See Wortham, supra note 6, at 364, 370, 417 (discussing the key provisions of the bills).
50 Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (1988).
51 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
52 JERRY, supra note 21, at 28. An annuity is an insurance contract in which "a finan-
cial institution (such as an insurer) ... in exchange for the individual's prior payment,
promises to make periodic payments to the individual for a stated amount of time." Id.
53 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
54 Id. at 711.
55 463 U.S. 1073 (1983).
56 Id. at 1083-86.
57 Two other federal statutes might constrain insurers' freedom to classify. The Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1145 (Supp. V
1993), regulates employee pension plans and employer-sponsored health plans. ERISA's
substantive regulations affect pensions, not health plans, so any substantive effect of ERISA
would be redundant with Manhart and Norris's interpretation of Title VII. See id. In fact,
ERISA actually increases insurers' freedom to classify. ERISA's preemption of state regula-
tions for self-insuring employers allows an increasing number of employers to escape state
restrictions on the use of classifiers. See infra note 281 and accompanying text.
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp.
V 1993), prohibits both private and public employers from discriminating on the basis of
disability. Although its definition of "disability" is broad, the ADA does not prevent insur-
ers from using genetic information to classify insureds. Mark A. Rothstein, Genetic Discrimi-
nation in Employment and the Americans iith Disabilities Act, 29 Hous. L. Rv. 23, 81 (1992). It
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ployment discrimination doctrine than they tell us about our concept
of fair discrimination in insurance-they override, rather than alter,
the doctrine underlying the states' approach to sex discrimination in
insurance.58
3. State Statutes Forbidding "Unfair Discrimination"
In contrast to the limited federal constraints on insurance dis-
crimination, state law constraints are fairly extensive. State insurance
regulations serve a variety of purposes.59 For instance, they may re-
quire insurers to communicate terms and rates clearly to insureds in
order to enhance competition,60 or they may enact prohibitions
against fraud in order to protect consumers from unscrupulous sales
tactics.61
One purpose of state regulation of underwriting, coverage, and
rating decisions is to protect the public from "unfair discrimina-
tion."62 The earliest unfair discrimination statutes were designed to
prevent the practice of "rebating," in which insurance agents gave a
portion of their commissions to customers in order to induce them to
purchase insurance. 68 Consumers, frustrated by the uncertainty that
rebating introduced into the insurance purchasing process, pressed
for statutes forbidding "different treatment of people in the same class
and with the same life expectancy."64 Many insurance agents sup-
ported these efforts, since the pressure to give rebates lowered their
income.65 By 1960, every state had adopted some version of the Na-
tional Association of Insurance Commissioners' Model Unfair Trade
remains controversial whether the ADA prevents employers from using genetic informa-
tion to classify employees. See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
58 See Lea Brilmayer et al., Sex Discrimination in Employer-Sponsored Insurance Plans: A
Legal and Demographic Analysis, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 505 (1980) [hereinafter SexDiscrimination
in Employer-Sponsored Insurance Plans] (taking this view of Manhart); Lea Brilmayer et al., The
Efficient Use of Group Averages as Nondiscrimination: A Rejoinder to Professor Benston, 50 U. CH.
L. REv. 222 (1983) [hereinafter The Efficient Use of Group Averages as Nondiscrimination] (ar-
guing this view again).
59 See generally Kimball, supra note 32 (listing various purposes).
60 Wortham suggests that current regulations are too lax in this area. Wortham, supra
note 6, at 421; see also Stewart W. Kemp, Insurance and Competition, 17 IDAHo L. REv. 547,
580-81 (1981) (arguing in support of a bill that would require easily readable policies and
the preparation of "consumer shopping guides").
61 One former insurance agent has argued that fraud is common in the health insur-
ance market, and government regulation is inadequate to fight it. JoHN E. GREGG, THE
HEALTH INSURANCE RACKET AND HOW TO BEAT IT (1973).
62 Bailey et al., supra note 4, at 782.
63 Wortham, supra note 6, at 384.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 385.
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Practices Act.66 This Act defines "unfair trade practice" as the act of
"[m] aking or permitting any unfair discrimination between individuals
of the same class and equal expectation of life in the rates charged...
benefits payable . . . or in any other of the terms and conditions
"67
State unfair discrimination statutes now provide the most impor-
tant legal constraint on insurers' use of classifications.68 Modem in-
terpreters have read more than a concern about rebates into the term
"unfair," a term that the Model Act leaves undefined. Although state
legislators, 69 insurance commissioners,70 and commentators71 have
often taken conflicting positions, all have relied on some version of a
negative rights theory. They have not argued that all individuals have
a right to insurance or to the societal goods that insurance provides.
Rather, they have argued that individuals who are in a position to ac-
quire insurance should not be differentiated by "unfair" classifiers. 72
Two basic definitions of "fair" classifiers have been put forth.
Fairness could mean that insurers' classifications correspond to accu-
rate predictions of risk-the efficient discrimination view. Fairness
could also mean that insurers should only use characteristics that are
(a) causally connected to the risk measured, (b) controllable, and (c)
66 Bailey et a]., supra note 4, at 782. Wortham suggests that insurers and state regula-
tors pressed for the adoption offair discrimination statutes in order to avoid application of
federal antitrust laws under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Wortham, supra note 6, at 386.
67 MODEL UNFAR TRADE PRAcmcES Acr § 4(g) (1) (Nat'l Ass'n Ins. Comm'rs 1993); see
also Bailey et a]., supra note 4, at 782-83 n.17 (listing all the relevant state statutes as of
1976); Miller, supra note 17, at 747 (listing statutes); Wortham, supra note 6, at 382-83
(discussing state fair discrimination statutes). Cf Karen A. Clifford & Russel P. Iuculano,
AIDS and Insurance: The Rationale for ADS-Related Testing, 100 HAv. L. REV. 1806, 1809-10
(1987) (stating that all states have fair discrimination statutes that apply to health
insurance).
68 ABRAHAM, supra note 7, at 37.
69 See infra part II.C (discussing recent amendments to state unfair discrimination stat-
utes that specifically define genetic discrimination as an unfair practice).
70 State insurance commissioners in Florida, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey,
and Wyoming have attempted to use their regulatory power to ban sex discrimination in
insurance. FLORIDA ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 4-43.03 (1990) (nullified by Department of Ins. v.
Insurance Servs. Office, 434 So. 2d 908 (Fla. App. 1983)); 211 MASS. REGS. CODE §§ 35.00 et
seq. (1987) (nullified by Telles v. Commissioner of Ins., 574 N.E.2d 359 (Mass. 1991));
Insurance Servs. Office v. Commissioner of Ins., 381 So. 2d 515 (La. App. 1979) (overrul-
ing the Commissioner's order banning sex discrimination); see alsoAustin, supra note 17, at
528-30 (discussing the failed New Jersey and Wyoming regulations).
71 Compare Miller, supra note 17 (adopting anti-discrimination arguments to explain
why genetic discrimination ought to be banned) with Richard A. Epstein, The Legal Regula-
tion of Genetic Discrimination: Old Responses to New Technology, 74 B.U. L. Rgv. 1 (1994)
(adopting efficient discrimination arguments to explain why genetic discrimination should
be permitted).
72 Leah Wortham is an important exception to this generalization. She criticizes "the
dominant perspectives," arguing that they ignore important questions. Wortham, supra
note 6, at 350.
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not associated with historical or invidious discrimination-the anti-
discrimination view.73
The prohibition of "unfair discrimination between individuals of
the same class and equal expectation of life" leaves open the question
of what type of discrimination is unfair. The reference to "individuals
of the same class"74 suggests that insurers can discriminate between
individuals of different classes (as adverse selection and competition
drive them to do) but on what bases may these different classes be
formed? Participants in the debate over fairness in insurance discrimi-
nation have assumed that a definition of "fair classifiers" provides the
answer to this question, debating only whether fairness requires any-
thing other than the predictive accuracy of the classifiers used.75 In
order to determine which of these views, if either, reflects our societal
consensus, it is necessary to examine current "unfair discrimination"
law for race, sex, and genetic factors.
II
CURRENT "UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION" LAW
Insurers use experience or statistics to determine whether a po-
tential classifier is linked to high or low expected loss. 76 A high corre-
lation between two factors does not in itself show causation-the
frequency of rooster calls at sunrise, for example, does not mean that
roosters cause the sun to rise.77 But from the insurer's perspective
causation is irrelevant: a statistical link alone can be used to construct
statistically accurate risk classifications. Insurers have used race, sex,
and genetic factors as classifications because race, sex, and genetic fac-
tors are each statistically linked to level of risk.
A. Race as a Factor
Race is statistically correlated with many things, including, for ex-
ample, life expectancy-blacks on average live between six and seven
73 See supra note 7 (discussing alternative labels for these two perspectives).
74 MODEL UNFAIR TRADE PRAancES A-r § 4(g) (1) (Nat'l Ass'n Ins. Comm'rs 1993).
75 But see supra note 6 (Wortham is an exception).
76 Wortham, supra note 38, at 845. Not all predictive classifiers are used-only the
"cost-effective ones." Id. at 846; see also ABRAHAm, supra note 7, at 78 (discussing non-cost-
effective classifiers). Wortham labels the extra requirements as "stability, reliability, and
administrative convenience." Wortham, supra note 88, at 846. Wortham suggests that in-
surers may also wish to use classifications that do not predict riskiness, noting that "[s]ome
evidence indicates that classifications may be chosen to attract buyers... who own more
property and thus are more likely to buy larger and multiple policies." Id. at 845. This is
the exception rather than the rule, however.
Intuition may play as large a role as statistics in the underwriting context. SeeHoLTOM,
supra note 26, at 2; see also supra note 33.
77 See infra part IfI.A for a further discussion of the importance of causation.
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fewer years than whites.78 Such correlations have existed for many
years.79 It is reasonable to assume that the differences stem from
American history and culture, rather than race itself (defined biologi-
cally).80 But the correlations themselves could be used to define in-
surance risk classes: whites would need to pay more for annuities, for
example, while blacks might need to pay higher rates for life
insurance.81
For many years insurers did use race as a classifier. Although
some states banned race classifications after the Civil War,8 2 in other
states race was a commonly used classifier through the 1950s,8 3 and
insurers frequently charged whites and blacks different rates for annu-
ities and life insurance.8 4 Eventually, however, race classification be-
gan to be seen as a repugnant practice.85 Some states passed statutes
specifically forbidding the use of race as a classifier,8 6 while other
78 BuREAU OF THE CENSus, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSrRACr OF THE
UNITED STATES 87 (1994) (Table No. 114, listing different life expectancies for black and
white populations).
79 See Bailey et al., supra note 4, at 793 n.54 (citing mortality census data from 1973);
Robert H.Jerry, II & Kyle B. Mansfield,Justifying Unisex Insurance: AnotherPerspectiv4 34 AM.
U. L. Rxv. 329, 351 n.135, 352 (1985) (citing a 1950 study of mortality differences among
"blacks, Caucasians, and Orientals," and noting "[t]hroughout this century, the average
nonwhite person has had a shorter lifespan than the average white person"); Kimball, supra
note 32, at 496 (noting in 1961 "the undeniable fact that mortality experience for all Ne-
groes is less favorable than experience for all whites").
80 It is not at all clear that race can be defined biologically. SeeJAMES E. BoWMAN &
ROBERT F. MuRRAY, JR., GENETIC VARIATION AND DISORDERS IN PEOPLES OF AFRICAN ORIGIN
15-21 (1990). While "categorizations of human populations are capricious," id. at 21, Bow-
man and Murray nonetheless present a study of the genetic characteristics of peoples of
African origin. They note some genetic differences; for instance, they examine differences
in the incidence of sickle cell anemia. Id. at 192. The few genetic differences that have
been found, however, do not account for differences in mortality or the other statistical
differences in risk that interest insurers.
81 Jerry & Mansfield, supra note 79, at 352 ("Viewed solely from the economic per-
spective of the insurer, a black person is a better risk in an annuity contract than a similarly
situated white person, and a white person is a better risk on a life insurance contract than a
similarly situated black person.").
82 Id. Wortham notes two such early bans: MAss. GEN. LAwS ANN. ch. 175, § 122 (West
1977) (first passed in 1884) and MICH. CoMp. LAws ANN. § 500.2082 (West 1983) (first
passed in 1869). Wortham, supra note 6, at 365 n.68.
83 Wortham, supra note 6, at 365.
84 Id. at 351.
85 Jerry & Mansfield, supra note 79, at 353.
86 E.g., Amiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 20-283, sub. 2 (West 1990); Aiut CODE ANN. § 23-66-
206(7) (G) (Michie 1987); CAL. INS. CODE §§ 10140-10141 (West 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 38a-816 (West 1992); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 215 § 5/424 (Smith-Hurd 1980);
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304.12-085 (Baldwin 1994); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48a, § 234B(d)
(1994); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 175, § 122 (Law. Co-op. 1987); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 500.2082 (West 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-18-210 (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:29B-
4(7) (c), (d) (West 1994); N.Y. INs. LAW § 2606 (McKinney 1985); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN.
§ 26.1-04-03 (Supp. 1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3911.16 (Anderson 1989); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 40, § 1171.5(7) (iii) (1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-62-14 (1993); WASH. REV. CODE
AN. §§ 49.60.178 et seq. (West 1991); WIs. STAT. § 942.04(1)(d) (1959).
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states assumed this result under their unfair discrimination statutes.87
By the late 1960s, insurers had converted to race-neutral actuarial ta-
bles;88 by the 1980s, insurers claimed not to use race classification at
all. 89
Ironically, bans on race classification may have made some types
of insurance less accessible to blacks. Insurers who could not charge
blacks more for property insurance, for example, chose not to offer
insurance in certain locales.90 This "redlining" practice has not been
found to violate race discrimination bans, since it relies on classifica-
tions other than race.9' However, anti-discrimination proponents
might find redlining and other forms of "impact" discrimination just
as problematic as the explicit use of race as a classifier. If anti-discrim-
ination proponents were concerned with results rather than means,
they might demand a ban on the use of any classifier that had an
adverse impact on a protected category of persons. Federal legislation
has adopted another approach: the Fair Access to Insurance Require-
ments (FAIR) program, for example, provided federal reinsurance of
the riot hazard to insurers who offered property insurance in high risk
urban areas. 92 Commentators have recommended similar solutions to
the problem of impact discrimination in business insurance. 93 In gen-
eral, the solution to impact discrimination seems to lie outside the
definition of "unfair discrimination."
87 Bailey et al., supra note 4, at 793.
88 Jerry & Mansfield, supra note 79, at 353. The conversion to race-neutral tables may
have been driven as much by the anticipation of imminent regulation as by regulation
itself. Id. at 352 n.139 ("The change probably occurred when insurers realized that the
torrent of federal legislation prohibiting racial discrimination in various aspects of society
could reach insurance practices if the industry did not take steps to eliminate such discrim-
ination."); see also HOLTOM, supra note 26, at 173 ("Where data are not so certain, under-
writers should immediately drop all consideration of these factors; any continuation under
these circumstances will only lead to further laws and regulations.").
89 Wortham, supra note 6, at 365.
90 Jerry & Mansfield, supra note 79, at 353 n.41; see Richard H. Sander, Comment,
Individual Rights and Demographic Realities: The Problem of Fair Housing 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 874
(1988) (analyzing the extent of housing segregation).
91 Jerry & Mansfield, supra note 79, at 353 n.41.
92 The FAIR program was established by the Urban Property Insurance Protection
and Reinsurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-3 to § 1749bbb-10 (1982). Although the pro-
gram terminated in 1983, 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb(b) (1) (1994), many states have continued
the program on their own. Wortham, supra note 6, at 396. See generally Works, supra note
11 (analyzing the FAIR program).
93 Martin J. Katz, Insurance and the Limits of Rational Discrimination, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y
REv. 436 (1990) (describing the impact of "rational discrimination" on blacks seeking busi-
ness insurance and suggesting that the government subsidize the cost of insurance for
black businesses, rather than attempt to forbid such rational discrimination).
1660 [Vol. 80:1646
NOTE-GENETIC DISCRMINATION
B. Sex as a Factor
Sex, like race, correlates with many risk factors, including life ex-
pectancy,9 4 number of automobile accidents, 95 and use of medical
services. 96 As with race, it is not clear that the biology of sex causes
any of these risks,97 although the biological differences between men
and women are far greater than those dividing the various races.9 8
Insurers have used these statistical differences as the basis for sex dis-
crimination with respect to underwriting, rating, and coverage. 99
The debate over the legitimacy of sex discrimination in insurance
which took place in the 1980s was highly polarized, with one side ad-
vocating the efficient discrimination view and the other advocating
the anti-discrimination view.' 00 Although neither side conceded the
94 Jerry & Mansfield, supra note 79, at 340 (noting that, on average, women live
longer than men); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 78, at 87.
95 JERRY, supra note 21, at 338-39 (noting that on average women have fewer accidents
than men); BuRnAu OF THE CENSUS, supra note 78, at 136 (statistics on fatal automobile
accidents); AnRAH-m, supra note 7, at 91 (noting that driver's sex accounts for greater than
one-third of the explainable variance of expected loss distribution among drivers.).
96 Jerry & Mansfield, supra note 79, at 343 (noting that the cost of maternity coverage
increases the cost of health and disability insurance for women).
97 See Charles E. Lewis & Mary Ann Lewis, The Potential Impact of Sexual Equality On
Heath, 297 NEv ENG.J. MED. 863 (1977) (arguing that morbidity and mortality differences
between men and women are more related to behavior and role in society than to biologic
inheritance).
98 This is especially true to the extent that race is a socially constructed concept. See
BowMAN & MURRAY, supra note 80, at 15-21.
99 Janet Sydlaske, Comment, Gender Classifications in the Insurance Industry, 75 CoLuM.
L. REv. 1381 (1975); see also Insurance Costs Skyrocketingfor Women, supra note 29 (explaining
that disability insurers who offered unisex pricing in the 1980s have now returned to sex-
distinct rates, charging women up to 50% more than men for the same coverage).
100 Sydlaske, supra note 99, at 1403 (arguing for ajudicial or legislative ban on use of
sex as a classifier); Spencer L. Kimball, Reverse Sex Discrimination: Manhart, 1979 Am. B.
FOUND. REs.J. 83 [hereinafter Reverse SexDiscrimination] (adopting the efficient discrimina-
tion view, and thus arguing that the Supreme Court's decision ordering Title VII employ-
ers to offer only unisex pension plans was in error); Sex Discrimination in Employer-Sponsored
Insurance Plans, supra note 58 (arguing that employer-sponsored pensions should be neu-
tral, under the anti-discrimination view); Spencer L. Kimball, Rerise on Manhart, 1980 Am.
B. FOUND. RES.J. 915 [hereinafter Reprise on Manhart] (defending the efficient discrimina-
tion view); Douglas Laycock & Teresa A. Sullivan, Sex Discrimination as "Actuarial Equality":
A Rejoinder to Kimba, 1981 Am. B. FOUND. RES. J. 221 (responding to Reprise on Manhart,
supra, emphasizing that Title VII requires the imposition of the anti-discrimination view);
Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, Privacy, Efficiency, and the Equality of Men and Women: A
Revisionist View of Sex Discrimination inEmployment 1981 Am. B. FOUND. REs.J. 585 (disagree-
ing with Brilmayer et al.'s interpretation of Title VII in Sex Discrimination in Employer-Spon-
sored Insurance Plans, supra note 58); George J. Benston, The Economics of Gender
Discrimination in Employee Fringe Benefits: Manhart Revisited, 49 U. CHI. L. Rxv. 489 (1982)
[hereinafter The Economics of Gender Discrimination] (arguing that efficient discrimination
demands the use of sex as a classifier for employer-offered pensions); The Efficient Use of
Group Averages as Nondiscrimination, supra note 58 (criticizing Benston's logic and data in
The Economics of GenderDiscrimination, supra, and arguing once more for the anti-discrimina-
tion view); GeorgeJ. Benston, Discrimination and Economic Efficieny in Employee Fringe Bene-
fits: A Claification of Issues and a Response to Professors Brilmayer, Laycock, and Sullivan, 50 U.
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philosophical debate, those supporting the use of sex as a classifier
won in the legislative arena. 1 1 Only Montana flatly forbids sex dis-
crimination in insurance. 10 2 California actually requires the use of gen-
der-specific tables for life insurance and annuities. 103 Most states
tolerate the use of sex as a classifier as a form of fair discrimination;
where regulators have attempted to ban sex discrimination under un-
fair discrimination statutes, courts have rebuffed them, stating that ac-
tuarially sound discrimination "cannot be unfair."10 4 Ironically for
women, the one exception to states' toleration of sex discrimination is
CHI. L. RE V. 250 (1983) [hereinafter Discrimination and Economic Effiiency] (responding to
the arguments in The Efficient Use of Group Averages as Nondiscrimination, supra note 58);
Mary W. Gray & Sana F. Shtasel, Insurers Are Surviving Without Sex, 71 ABAJ. 89 (Feb. 1985)
(discussing Norris and arguing against sex discrimination in insurance generally).
101 "Legislative arena" is here limited to state law. If Manhart and Norris's interpreta-
tions of Title VII apply to all forms of employer-sponsored insurance, then they represent a
large victory for the anti-discrimination proponents at the federal level.
See Kaufman, supra note 43, for a discussion of (failed) federal legislation banning the
use of sex (as well as race, color, religion, or national origin) as a classifier. Kaufman
argues that the nondiscrimination bill would not be very costily. Id. at 638-39. Cf GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE FAIR INSURANCE PRACTICES ACT
(1984) (concluding that the bill's short-run effects would be significant).
One commentator notes an interesting political twist on the fair discrimination de-
bate: President Reagan supported efforts to ban the use of sex classifications because the
legislation fit with Reagan's opposition to affirmative action. DOUGLAS CADDY, LEGISLATIvE
TRENDS IN INSURANCE REGULATION 95-96 (1986).
102 MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-309 (1991). Insurance industry lobbyists have been seek-
ing repeal of the ban on sex discrimination. Wortham, supra note 6, at 366 n.78.
103 CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(f) (West Supp. 1993). The provision was designed to en-
sure that women buying life insurance receive the full benefit of their greater life expec-
tancy (and presumably also to ensure that men's annuities reflect their shorter life
expectancies). A 1985 California Attorney General Opinion found that § 790.03(f) violates
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of
Article I, § 7, of the California constitution. Yet, despite this acknowledgement, no court
challenge has been successful. See, e.g., Fiske v. Gillespie, 246 Cal. Rptr. 552 (CL App. 2d
Dist. 1988) (suit to enjoin the insurance commissioner from spending funds to enforce
§ 790.03(f) dismissed because too little money was involved to give plaintiffs standing as
taxpayers). However, this provision does not apply to pensions offered by employers who
are covered by Tide VII. See Manhart and Norris discussion, supra notes 50-58 and accom-
panying text; see also S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 58-24-6.1 (Supp. 1990) (defining unfair
discrimination as rates "to reflect equitably the difference in expected losses and
expenses").
104 Department of Ins. vs. Insurance Servs. Office, 434 So. 2d 908 (Fla. Dist. CL App.
1983), petition denied, 444 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 1984). In Department of Insurance, the court over-
turned FLA. ADMIN. ANN. r. 4-43.03 (1990), which banned sex discrimination in automobile
insurance. The Louisiana Insurance Commissioner's attempted ban of sex discrimination
in automobile insurance was similarly rejected. Insurance Servs. Office v. Commissioner of
Ins., 381 So. 2d 515 (La. Ct. App. 1979). In rejecting the ban, the court concluded that if
there was "a sound statistical basis" for the discrimination, then it was not unfair. Id. at 517.
In Telles v. Commissioner of Ins., 574 N.E.2d 359 (Mass. 1991), the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts held that the state insurance commissioner did not have the authority under
the state fair discrimination statute to prohibit life insurance underwriting decisions based
on sex differences in mortality. Regulators in NewJersey and Wyoming have also failed in
their attempts to ban sex discrimination in insurance. Austin, supra note 17, at 528 n.57.
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in automobile insurance, where statistics support charging women
lower premiums.' 05 A number of state legislatures have declared that
sex discrimination in automobile insurance is unfair, without ex-
tending the argument to other types of insurance. 06 Apparently Ken-
neth Abraham guesses wrongly when he supposes that "[t] he symbolic
effect of eliminating sex-based classifications only when they [benefit]
women would probably be intolerable." 0 7
The effect of sex discrimination in insurance can be quite dra-
matic. Disability insurance provides an example. After offering
unisex pricing in the early 1980s, all four of the nation's major disabil-
ity insurers have now returned to sex-distinct pricing, in response to
the statistics showing that women tend to file a higher number of
claims. 108 As a result, the cost of disability insurance for women rose
thirty-nine percent in 1994, and women today may need to pay fifty
percent more than men to get the same coverage. 09
The preceding discussion focuses on sex discrimination in insur-
ance rates. However, during the 1970s more lawsuits were brought to
challenge sex discrimination in underwriting and coverage than in
rating." 0 State statutes and regulations reflect the same focus. Bailey
notes a trend "to assure that coverage, in like kind and amount, is
uniformly available to individuals without regard to sex.""' The rea-
105 ABRAHAM, supra note 7, at 91. If insurers switched to unisex rates for automobile
insurance, young women's rates would rise by 26% and young men's rates would drop by
6%. Id.
106 See HAw. Rxv. STAT. § 294-33 (1976); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 175, §§ 22E, 24A
(West 1987); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.2027 (West 1993); N.G. GEN. STAT. § 58-3-25
(1994). Cf FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.0651(6) (West 1984) (For automobile insurance, "[o]ne
rate shall be deemed unfairly discriminatory in relation to another in the same class if it
clearly fails to reflect equitably the differences in expected losses and expenses.").
107 ABRAHAM, supra note 7, at 95. Abraham actually writes "only where they disadvantage
women," id. (emphasis added), but it is clear from context that he meant the opposite. He
states that although a ban on sex discrimination in automobile insurance would probably
result in less economic inefficiency than a ban on sex discrimination in annuities, banning
one and not the other should be unacceptable, given historical discrimination against wo-
men. Id. at 94-95. Wortham cautions:
Although one is tempted to ascribe the regulatory enthusiasm regarding
automobile insurance to the benefits men receive from the elimination of
gender classification, there are probably a number of other factors as well.
The primary concern in automobile insurance is not the insured but liabil-
ity to third parties. The fact that automobile insurance is often required
has been considered important.... Many states have more elaborate state
code provisions concerning automobile insurance than other lines.
Wortham, supra note 6, at 395 n.267.
108 Insurance Costs Skyrocketing for Women, supra note 29.
109 Id.
110 SydneyJ. Key, Sex-Based Pension Plans in Perspective City of Los Angeles Department
of Water and Power v. Manhart, 2 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 1, 40-43 (1979).
111 Bailey et aL, supra note 4, at 802. "While some states have achieved this result by
legislation, most have tried to reach the same result by adoption of regulations under their
Unfair Trade Practices Acts." Id.
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son for the distinction between rating and underwriting and coverage
is not immediately apparent. Wortham mentions the distinction as an
oddity: "Many states restrict the use of sex classification in underwrit-
ing and coverage, but there are few such restrictions regarding rating
even though significant rate differentials can have the same effect as a
refusal to underwrite if the rate is ... unaffordable."" 2
C. Genetic Factors
Genes are segments of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) found in
human cells." 3 The sequence of DNA bases in each gene encodes
hereditary information"14 that controls human traits, physical charac-
teristics, and disease predispositions." 5 Scientists use the label "geno-
type" to distinguish different versions of the same gene and the label
"phenotype" to distinguish different traits, characteristics, or predispo-
sitions produced by genes." 6 Many different genotypes can produce
the same phenotype, and different phenotypes can arise from the
same genotype." 7 The latter is true because genes alone are not usu-
ally determinative. Both genotype and the environment-"nature
and nurture"-affect phenotype." 8
Over the past twenty-five years, researchers have made tremen-
dous progress in their quest to locate genes along the genome" 9 and
to understand the roles and effects of various genes. In 1970 almost
no genes had been mapped; in 1991 nearly 2000 had been.120 The
Human Genome Project121 has greatly increased the rate of new map-
pings. The goal of the Project is to determine the entire human DNA
sequence, to identify all 100,000 or more genes, and to provide new
tools to analyze the effects of these genes. 122
112 Wortham, supra note 6, at 366.
113 Paul R. Billings, The Scientific Basis of the "Genetic Revolution" A Selective Review, in
THE GENOME, ETHICS AND THE LAW: ISSUES IN GENETIc TESTING 23, 26 (1992) [hereinafter
THE GENOME] (summarizing the current understanding of gene structure and function, as
part of a report of a conference held by the AAAS-ABA National Conference of Lawyers
and Scientists and the AAAS Committee on Scientific Freedom and ResponsibilityJune 14-
16, 1991).
14 Id.
115 Id. at 25.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 29-30.
119 The genome or "gene home" refers to the site where genes reside within the cell.
Id. at 27. The chromosomes are one genome; human cells also contain DNA within mito-
chondria. Id.
120 Tabitha M. Powledge, Ethical and Legal Implications of Genetic Testing. A Synthesis, in
THE GENOME, supra note 113, at 4.
121 The National Institutes of Health sponsor the Human Genome Project or Human
Genome Initiative. THE GENOME, supra note 113, at v.
122 Powledge, supra note 120, at 4; see also Begley et al., The Genome Initiativ NEWS-
WEEK, Aug. 31, 1987, at 58 (describing the goals of the Project).
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Genetic tests can discover whether a person has a certain geno-
type, either by recognizing the actual DNA sequence of that gene (or
genes), or by identifying nearby "markers."1 23 There are three main
kinds of genetic tests available: 124 those that search for carriers, 125
those that search for people currently affected with a disease,126 and
those that search for people who may become ill in the future.' 27 All
three types of genetic tests might play a role in the insurance context,
but the last type of test plays the most central role in the insurance
discrimination debate. Insurers would not normally be interested in
whether an insured was a carrier (i.e., had a carrier genotype) so long
as he or she was not at risk of developing the disease (i.e., developing
the phenotype).128 Insurers would use the second type of test to en-
force a "pre-existing conditions" exclusion clause. 129 Only the last
type of test predicts an insured's expected loss; thus, this is the type of
genetic test that allows an insurer to practice "fair discrimination."
Efficient discrimination requires only that a classifier be statisti-
cally correlated with risk. Some genes are statistically correlated with
risk in the strongest possible sense.' 30 Huntington's disease, a pro-
gressive neurodegenerative disorder, provides an example.' 3 ' It
123 THE GENOME, sutra note 113, at 30.
124 Powledge, supra note 120, at 3-4.
125 Id. Carriers are people who do not have and will not develop a disease, but who are
at risk of having a child with the disease.
126 Id. at 4. This type of test is often used prenatally or shortly after birth to identify
genetic traits such as Down syndrome and phenylketonuria. Id.
127 Id.
128 But see Mark A. Rothstein, Discrimination Based on Genetic Information, 33JuIMmEiucs
J. 13, 15-16 (1992) (hypothesizing that insurers-or employers acting as insurers-may
reject applicants who are carriers because the insurer would be liable for the costs of the
applicant's children as well as the costs of the applicant).
129 See David Cooper & Michael Barefoot, Can You Buy Insurance for Your Genes?, NEw
SciENTIsT, July 16, 1987, at 51. Cooper and Barefoot report in their survey that a British
insurance company "declared its intention to exclude benefit for any condition that was
detected before the start of the policy." Id. at 51.
130 Alfred G. Knudson, Jr., Pathodemes: Heredity, Environment, and Populations of Disease
Susceptibiliy, in GENETIcs OF CELLULAR, INDIVIDUAL, FAMILY, AND POPULATION VARIABIITY
165 (Charles F. Sing & Craig L. Hanis eds., 1993). Knudson notes that there are rare
"individuals who have a genetic predisposition to cancer that is virtually independent of
their environmental exposures," id, at 166, and notes that certain other diseases are en-
tirely genetically determined, id. at 168. For a discussion of how genetic factors might
cause or contribute to the development of cancer, see YVONNE BASKIN, THE GENE DocroRs:
MEDIcAL GENERics AT THE FRONTIER 66-80 (1984).
131 See generally COMMrrrEE ON ASSESSING GENETIc RISKS, INST. OF MED., ASSESSING GE-
NETIC RISKS: IMPLCATIONS FOR HEALTH AND SoCIAL Pomuv 87-89 (Lori B. Andrews et al.
eds., 1994) [hereinafter AsSESSING GENETIc RISKS] (describing the nature of Huntington's
disease and ethical problems related to early testing); Gwen Terrenoire, Huntington's Dis-
ease and the Ethics of Genetic Prediction, 18 J. MED. ETHICS 79, 79-85 (1992) (same); see also
Cheryl L Becker, Note, Legal Implications of the G-8 Huntington's Disease Genetic Marker, 39
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 273, 301-302 (1988-89) (arguing that insurers should not have access
to the Huntington's disease genetic test results).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
strikes individuals between the ages of thirty and fifty, causing spas-
modic, involuntary movements, memory loss, personality changes,
chronic depression, and eventually death.13 2 In 1983, researchers dis-
covered a genetic marker linked to the Huntington's disease gene. 133
In 1993, researchers discovered the gene itself. 34 This genotype is
determinative: every individual who has the Huntington's disease
gene will develop Huntington's disease.13 5
Most genotypes, however, are not determinative. A type of
chronic spinal arthritis called "ankylosing spondylitis" provides an ex-
ample. Ninety percent of those with this disease carry a certain ge-
netic marker called "B27," but the vast majority of people with B27
(about nine percent of the population) do not develop the disease. 136
Thus, while the B27 genotype is correlated with a higher risk of devel-
oping ankylosing spondylitis, it does not guarantee the development
of the disease. Cancer provides another example. Most cancers have
been linked to genetic factors, but few cancers are purely genetic in
origin.' 37 One in two hundred people carries the gene for a certain
type of colon cancer, for instance, but only about sixty-five percent of
these people are likely to develop the cancer.'3 8 Heart disease, diabe-
tes, and mental illness are other examples of diseases that are linked
to both genes and environment. 3 9
Because of these statistical links, insurers can use genetic factors
to predict an insured's expected loss.140 Genetic factors apply most
obviously to classification for health insurance and life insurance,
although they could be used for other types of insurance as well.141
132 ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, supra note 131, at 88.
133 Id.
134 Philip Elmer-Dewitt, The Genetic Revolution, TIME, Jan. 17, 1994, at 46, 49. The
Huntington's disease gene was particularly difficult to identify because it is located in a
"hard-to-reach" spot on Chromosome 4, and because both the normal gene and the Hunt-
ington's disease gene are "stuttering genes"-their DNA sequence contains a repeated
"word" of nucleotides. Id. The normal gene contains this word from 11 to 34 times; the
Huntington's disease gene contains 37 to 100 copies. Id. The symptoms of the disease
may be more severe, and the onset of symptoms may be earlier, for those whose defective
gene has 80-100 copies of the repeated "word." Id.
135 Becker, supra note 131, at 273.
136 BASKIN, supra note 130, at 49-51.
137 See supra note 130.
138 Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 134, at 51.
139 See BASKIN, supra note 130, at 48-65.
140 In fact, race and sex discrimination could both be considered special types of ge-
netic discrimination, since race and sex are largely genetic characteristics. However, the
term "genetic discrimination" is normally only used to refer to discrimination based on
genotypes that are linked to disease phenotypes.
141 For example, automobile insurers would want to know whether an insured was at
risk of developing epilepsy, and disability insurers would want to know whether an insured
had a predisposition to any disabilities.
Professor Mark Rothstein points out some of the other possible uses of genetic infor-
mation outside of the insurance context:
1666 [Vol. 80:1646
19951 NOTE-GENETIC DISCRIMINATION 1667
Life and health insurers generally scrutinize possible insureds care-
fully in order to make underwriting, coverage, or rating decisions. A
1988 Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) study showed that
"eight percent of individual [health insurance] applicants are rejected
outright and another twenty-eight percent either pay more than the
standard premium or receive substandard coverage that typically ex-
cludes certain illnesses or types of coverage."1 42 These decisions have
been made in the past without the benefit of genetic testing results,1 4
primarily because genetic tests were too expensive to be cost-effective;
at $450 to $1000 per test, insurers were better off relying on the infor-
What about a mortgage lender trying to decide whether to agree to loan
hundreds of thousands of dollars for a thirty-year mortgage? Besides a ter-
mite inspection, might they also want a genetic inspection of the mortga-
gor? Or a medical school admissions committee or scholarship committee?
There might be great reluctance to invest tens of thousands of dollars in an
individual whose future health problems will prevent him or her from ever
practicing medicine. Or a potential partner in ajoint venture about to in-
vest large sums of money? Partners often have life insurance policies for
such contingencies; wouldn't they want to know about their partner's fu-
ture health? And wouldn't an individual's future health also be relevant to
an adoption agency, or a court in a child custody dispute, or medical per-
sonnel trying to decide which individuals qualify for organ transplants? In
what election year will the public and press demand to learn the genetic
profiles of presidential candidates?
Rothstein, supra note 128, at 13-14. These types of genetic discrimination raise slightly
different questions of fairness than the questions genetic discrimination in insurance pose,
since they involve discrimination by non-insurers, and since they involve access to different
sorts of societal goods.
142 Robert Lowe, Genetic Testing and Insurance: Apocalypse Now?, 40 DRAKE L. REV. 507,
513 (1991) (citing findings from U.S. CONGREss OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, MsDicAL. Tmsr-
ING AND HE.LT INsuRANcE (1988) [hereinafter OTA STUDY]). The OTA STUDY contained
the following table:
Risk Classifications by Commercial Health Insurers:
Common Conditions Requiring a Higher Premium,
Exclusion Waiver, or Denial
Hoffr Preinium Fxdusio Waiver Denial
Allergies Cataract AIDS
Asthma Gallstones Ulcerative colotis
Back strain Fibroid tumor (uterus) Cirrhosis of liver
Hypertension (controlled) Hernia (hiatal/inguinal) Diabetes mellitus
Arthritis Migraine headaches Leukemia
Gout Pelvic inflammatory disease Schizophrenia
Glaucoma Chronic otitis media (recent) Hypertension (uncontrolled)
Obesity Spine/back disorders Emphysema
Psychoneurosis (mild) Hemorroids Stroke
Kidney stones Knee impairment Obesity (severe)
Emphysema (mild to moderate) Asthma Angina (severe)
Alcoholism/drug use Allergies Coronary artery disease
Heart murmur Varicose veins Epilepsy
Peptic ulcer Sinusitis (chronic or severe) Lupus
Colitis Fractures Alcoholism/drug abuse
OTA STUDY, supra at 60 (Table 2-5). "Higher premium" is a rating decision; "exclusion
waiver" is a coverage decision; "denial" is an underwriting decision.
143 OTA STUDY, supra note 142, at 141 ("At present, [only] a small proportion of appli-
cants are tested.").
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mation on the insured's medical history questionnaire.14 Soon, how-
ever, cost-effective genetic tests will allow insurers to make decisions
about expected loss in a more fine-tuned way-instead of asking the
insured whether any of the insured's relatives had Huntington's dis-
ease, ankylosing spondylitis, cancer, or other diseases with genetic
components, insurers will measure the insured's risk directly.145
For a number of years, insurance industry observers have been
predicting widespread use of genetic tests. A 1987 OTA survey of bio-
technology companies found that nearly half of the companies ex-
pected insurers to regularly conduct genetic tests by the year 2000.146
This estimate may be too conservative: evidence suggests that insurers
may be able to use a wide variety of genetic tests even sooner. Insur-
ance companies have made substantial investments to develop genetic
tests for use in screening programs, 147 and some companies have al-
ready established laboratories that offer tests for Huntington's disease,
cystic fibrosis, adult polycystic kidney disease, and hemophilia. 148 The
market for genetic testing kits is likely to grow very rapidly. 149
Some genetic discrimination is likely to occur in the workplace,
because many employers act as insurers by offering group health in-
surance plans to their employees. 150 With group plans priced by the
employer's claims history, employers have an incentive to try to hire
only lower risk applicants. 151 This form of genetic discrimination
could be significant because two-thirds of all people with health insur-
ance obtain that insurance through their employers. 152 As health care
144 T.H. Cushing, Should There Be Genetic Testing in Insurance Risk Classification?, 60 DEF.
CotuNs.J. 249, 252 (1993).
145 See ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, supra note 131, at 35.
146 U.S. CONGRESS OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, GENETIC MONITORING AND SCREENING IN
THE WORKPLACE (1990) (reporting results of the 1987 survey); see also Kathleen McAuliffe,
PredictingDiseases, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., May 25, 1987, at 64-65 (reporting that Michael
McGinnis, director of the United States Office of Disease Prevention and Health Promo-
tion, predicts that most people will get genetic health profiles by the year 2000).
147 Marc Lapp6, The Limits of Genetic Inquiy, 17 HASTINGS CFN. REP. 5, 8 (Aug.-Sept.
1987). Lapp6 reports observations made by Neil Holtzman, a Johns Hopkins University
geneticist who works for the Office of Technology Assessment. Id.
148 Lowe, supra note 142, at 519 (citing an unpublished Staff Report from the Office of
Technology, M. Hewitt & N. Holtzman, The Commercial Development of Tests for Human
Genetic Disorders 1, 3 (Feb. 1988)).
149 Id. at 520.
150 OTA STUDY, supra note 142, at 43-44.
151 See Lowe, supra note 142, at 513 ("Premium rates [for group insurance] are usually
based on an evaluation of the risk of the entire group or on actual claims of the group in
previous years."); OTA STUDY, supra note 142, at 5. Employers can practice this sort of cost
containment without using genetic tests; for example, they may attempt to exclude appli-
cants who smoke, are infected with HIV, or have high cholesterol levels. Rothstein, supra
note 57, at 29.
152 Rothstein, supra note 128, at 14.
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costs rise, employers' efforts to screen potential employees will proba-
bly rise as well.'55
Just as with race and sex discrimination, genetic discrimination in
insurance has generated controversy. Here, however, an overwhelm-
ing majority has taken the same side: as a society we have reacted
strongly, and negatively, against the use of genetic classifiers. Legal
scholars caution that current laws are inadequate to prevent genetic
discrimination by insurers and suggest regulations that would prevent
this form of discrimination. 54 Newspaper and magazine articles re-
flect growing concern among the general public. 155 A 1985 Harris
153 The average cost per employee for employer health insurance rose from $1724 in
1985 to $3605 in 1991; insurance costs in general are rising 10% to 20% per year. Roth-
stein, supra note 128, at 14. If 5% of health insurance claimants account for about 50% of
health care expenditures, id. at 14-15, then employers are highly motivated to identify and
avoid hiring that 5%. A recent survey of 400 employers found that 15% of the employers
planned by the year 2000 to check the genetic status of potential employees and their
dependents before making employment offers. Shannon Brownlee & Joanne Silberner,
The Assurances of Genes, U.S. NEvs & WoRLD REP., July 23, 1990, at 57.
154 See Becker, supra note 131 (arguing that insurers should not be permitted to test
for the Huntington's disease gene); Lowe, supra note 142 (discussing the problems genetic
testing poses for health insurance); Miller, supra note 17 (arguing that genetic discrimina-
tion in insurance should be banned); Rothstein, supra note 57 (criticizing the ADA for its
lack of application to genetic discrimination); Kimberley Nobles, Note, Birthright or Life
Sentence: Controlling the Threat of Genetic Testing, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 2081 (1992) (suggesting
regulations to control the use of genetic testing); Larry Gostin, Genetic Discrimination: The
Use of Genetically Based Diagnostic and Prognostic Tests by Employers and Insurers, 17 AM. J. L. &
MED. 109 (1991) (discussing risks of genetic discrimination and the inability of current
federal laws, including the ADA, to prevent those risks). But cf. Epstein, supra note 71
(arguing that efficient genetic discrimination ought to be permitted).
155 See, e.g., Alex Barnum, Down Side to Scientific Success: Insurers Use Genes to Deny Cover-
age, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 2, 1992, at A1; Judy Berlfein, Genetic Testing. Health Care Trap, LA.
TimEs, Apr. 30, 1990, at B2; Sandra Blakeslee, Gene Defects Make Insurance Diffcult to Get:
Wary Patients Avoid Tests, MLAMi HEALD, Jan. 27, 1991, at 1H; Sandra Blakeslee, Insurance
Denied Some with Genetic Abnormalities, STAR TRIB., Dec. 27, 1990, at IlIA; Jim Dejen, Will
Genetics Revolution Mark Some as Victims? One Scientist Has Documented 50 Cases of Genetic
Discrimination, PHIL. INQ., Nov. 10, 1991, at Al; Double Helix Battles, WAsH. POST, May 1,
1992, at A26 (editorial) ("The implications of this [genetic] information extend to ques-
tions about... genetic discrimination and even the potential ruin of the health insurance
system."); Experts Warn of Genetic Prejudice, PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 19, 1991, at 8A, Genetic Test-
ing: Protecting the Rights of the Insured, STAR TRIB., Feb. 14, 1995, at 12A (editorial); Debra
Gordon, Breast Cancer Activists Wony that a Bad Gene Will Cancel Insurance: They Want the
1996 Assembly to Enact a Shield Against Prdudice, VIRGINLAN-PiLoT, Jan. 19, 1995, at Al; Peter
Gorner, Book Review, Promise and Menace in the Gene-Mapping Project, CHI. TRiB., July 1,
1992, at 3 (Tempo section); Health Fairness, Insurance Sense, PLAIN DFALER, Mar. 20, 1992, at
60 ("Soon, exploding knowledge about genetic disease markers will put the entire popula-
tion at risk for health-insurance exclusions or tailoring that may leave many exposed to
potentially crushing health-care costs."); Health Report, TIME, Nov. 15, 1993, at 33 ("The Bad
News... Genetic screening has already cost some American workers their jobs and health
insurance.... Unless laws are passed to protect the confidentiality of DNA-test results, the
problem will only get worse as scientists discover genetic links to more and more dis-
eases."); DanielJ. Kevles & Leroy Hood, The Genetic Labyrinth, LA TIMES, Nov. 8, 1992, at
28, 30 (Magazine) ("The torrent of new human genetic information will undoubtedly chal-
lenge many socioeconomic values and practices.... [M]edical or life insurers might ex-
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poll found that seventy-five percent of respondents thought that insur-
ers should not be able to use genetic tests to decide whom to in-
sure, 156 while a more recent Time/CNN poll found that ninety
percent of respondents held this opinion. 157
When similar opposition to race discrimination in insurance de-
veloped, some courts interpreted their states' fair discrimination laws
as prohibiting race discrimination. 158 But genetic discrimination has
not yet been attacked through the courts, perhaps because the public
reaction against genetic discrimination has grown so swiftly that it de-
mands a swifter and broader response than state courts can provide.
Recent decisions by courts rejecting challenges to AIDS discrimina-
tion suggest another possible explanation: the efficient discrimina-
tion perspective, rather than the anti-discrimination perspective, may
have become entrenched as the dominant approach to interpreting
state unfair discrimination laws.159 In Life Insurance Association v. Com-
missioner of Insurance,'60 for example, the Massachusetts Supreme
Court held that the Massachusetts insurance commissioner could not
prevent insurance companies from testing for the AIDS virus in order
to make underwriting decisions, stating that "insurers have the right
to classify risks and to elect not to insure risks if the discrimination is
fair."'161
Some existing state statutes explicitly ban genetic discrimination
in insurance-but only if there is no actuarial justification for the dis-
ploit [genetic information] to exclude [people] from coverage."); Robin Marantz-Henig,
Pitfalls of Genetic Screening: New Techniques Raise Difficult Ethical Questions, WAsH. POsT, Jan.
29, 1991, at Z14; John Matthews, Bias Based on Genetic Testing Targeted, SACRAMENTO BEE,
May 7, 1995, at A3; Susan Moffat, PlanforDNA Database Assailed, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1992,
at A5 ("[P]rivacy advocates fear that [genetic information] could be used to exclude peo-
ple from jobs or insurance coverage."); Richard Saltus, Perils Amid Promises of Gene Research:
Scientists Warn of Danger of Discrimination, BosTON GLOBE, Apr. 9, 1991, at A17; David Sat-
terfield, Genetic Test Question: What About Insurance, MAmi HERALD, Mar. 1, 1993, at 1C;
Donna Shaw, Genetic Gains Raise Fear of a New Kind of Bias, PHIL. INQ., Nov. 23, 1990, at Al;
Larry Thompson, The Price of Knowledge: Genetic Tests That Predict Dire Conditions Become a
Two-Edged Sword, WASH. PosT, Oct. 10, 1989, at Z7.
156 Joan O'C. Hamilton, The Giant Strides in Spotting Genetic Disorders Early, Bus. WL.,
Nov. 18, 1985, at 82, 85.
157 Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 134, at 48.
158 See supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
159 See Miller, supra note 17, at 750 (arguing that "inertia exists.... [because] judicial
interpretations of the statutes permitting any reasonably-based classification ... have been
in existence for several decades.... [and the] insurance industries vigorously defend [this)
interpretation [of] unfair discrimination statutes.").
160 530 N.E.2d 168 (Mass. 1988).
161 Id. at 171; see also Health Ins. Ass'n v. Corcoran, 531 N.Y.S.2d 456, 460 (Sup. Ct.
1988) (holding that the New York insurance commissioner could not prevent insurance
companies from using AIDS tests in making insurance decisions because the New York fair
discrimination law allows risk classification based on actuarial differences).
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crimination.162 These laws fail to settle the controversy over genetic
discrimination, because the public has objected to any form of genetic
discrimination, not simply non-actuarially justified discrimination.
Federal statutes such as the Americans with Disabilities Act163 permit
genetic discrimination by insurers and do not explicitly forbid genetic
discrimination by employers.' 64 Thus, pressure has mounted on state
legislatures to pass new, broad bans on genetic discrimination.
State legislatures are beginning to respond. Some have focused
on genetic discrimination by employers. In 1989, for example, Ore-
gon amended its unlawful employment practices statute to forbid em-
ployers from requiring applicants or employees to undergo "genetic
screening."' 65 Although the amendment did not define the term "ge-
netic screening," it could be understood to prevent employers from
162 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-448.E (1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-18-206 (1994); see
also CAL. INS. CODE §§ 10143-10144 (West 1993) (forbidding discrimination against carriers
and against those physically impaired when such discrimination would not be actuarially
justified).
Several states specifically forbid discrimination against those with sickle cell trait. See,
e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 448.075 (West 1981) (employment discrimination); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 626.9706-.9707 (West 1984) (insurance discrimination); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22:652.1
(West 1995) (insurance discrimination); LA. Rzv. STAT. ANN. §§ 23:1001-:1004 (West 1985)
(employment discrimination); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(y) (West 1991) (employment dis-
crimination); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(a) (West 1991) (insurance discrimination); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 58-58-25 (1991) (insurance discrimination); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-28.1 (1989)
(employment discrimination). These laws, like the Maryland and California laws, reflect
the efficient discrimination view, because sickle cell trait does not predict a higher risk of
illness for the individual who has it. Individuals with sickle cell trait (those with only one
copy of the sickle cell gene) are only carriers; they do not have, and will not develop, sickle
cell disease. See supra note 125 and accompanying text (discussing genetic tests for carri-
ers); BASKiN, supra note 130, at 129 (discussing the confusion that once existed regarding
the difference between sickle cell anemia and sickle cell trait).
163 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. V 1993).
164 See Gostin, supra note 154 (discussing the ADA and ERISA); Nobles, supra note 154,
at 2105-17 (discussing Title VII, the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA, the Privacy Act, and the
proposed Human Genome Privacy Act of 1990); Rothstein, supra note 57 (discussing the
ADA); Rothstein, supra note 128, at 16-17 (discussing the ADA and ERISA).
The extent of ADA coverage for employees remains unclear. The statute prohibits
discrimination against those who are "regarded as" having a disability, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 12102(2) (C) (1995), but leaves as an open question whether a person with an asymptom-
atic genetic condition falls into.this category. Originally the EEOC interpreted the statute
to preclude coverage for individuals with a genetic predisposition to illness. See Rothstein,
supra note 128, at 17 (citing Letter from Ronnie Blumenthal, Acting Director of Communi-
cations and Legislative Affairs, EEOC, to Rep. Bob Wise, Chairman, House Subcommittee
on Government Information,Justice, and Agriculture (Nov. 22, 1991)); ASSESSING GENETIC
RisKS, supra note 131, at 272 (discussing the EEOC's negative response to a request from
an NIH-DOEJoint Working Group to broaden its rules to include protection for individu-
als who are susceptible to a genetic disorder). Recently, however, the EEOC reversed itself.
In a new compliance manual issued March 15, 1995, the commission stated that the term
"disability" includes a genetic predisposition to disease. See Warren E. Leary, Using Gene
Tests to DenyJobs is Ruled Illegal, N.Y. TimEs, Apr. 8, 1995, at A4. The EEOC's latest interpre-
tation is currently the most authoritative, since no court has yet addressed this question.
165 OR. Rnv. STAT. § 659.227 (1990).
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rejecting genetically high risk applicants, an action employers might
otherwise take to control their group health insurance costs. In 1991
the California legislature passed a broader prohibition on genetic dis-
crimination in employment, although Governor Wilson vetoed this
legislation.1 66 In 1992 Wisconsin adopted a prohibition similar to Cal-
ifornia's, specifying that employers cannot require genetic testing or
use information from genetic tests administered by others. 167 Several
other states have followed suit.168
Legislatures have also addressed genetic discrimination by insur-
ance companies. Arizona and Montana have passed bills forbidding
insurance companies from denying life insurance based on a genetic
condition.1 69 The Ohio legislature considered a series of bills, rang-
ing from a narrow ban on insurers' use of laboratory genetic tests to a
broad ban on insurers' use of "hereditary" information (from genetic
tests or from medical history questionnaires), 70 before finally passing
a bill that prevents health insurers from using genetic test results in
underwriting, coverage, or rating decisions.' 71 Other states that have
recently banned genetic discrimination by health insurers include Cal-
ifornia, 172  Colorado, 75  Georgia, 74  New Hampshire, 7 5  and
Wisconsin.176
166 Cal. A.B. 1888 (1991). The law would have prohibited employment discrimination
based on genetic characteristics, defined as "any scientifically or medically identifiable
gene or chromosome, or alteration thereof, which is known to be a cause of a disease or
disorder, or determined to be associated with a statistically increased risk of development
of a disease or disorder, and which is asymptomatic of any disease or disorder." Id. The
legislature! is currently considering another bill to prohibit employers from practicing ge-
netic discrimination. Cal. S.B. 970 (1995).
167 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.372 (West 1994).
168 Iowa, Florida, and Rhode Island have also passed bans on genetic discrimination in
employment. See Christine Gorman, The Doctor's Crystal Ball, TIME, Apr. 10, 1995, at 60
(discussing Iowa and Rhode Island laws); Sandra Sugawara, Biotech Debate: Who Will Read
the Cene Maps?, WASH. PosT, July 5, 1992, at H1 (discussing Iowa and Florida laws). The
Texas legislature is currently considering a bill that would ban genetic discrimination by
both employers and insurers. 1995 Tex. H.B. 343; see also L.M. Sixel, Employing Genetics in
Hiring; Bill Would Curb Use in Testing, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 6, 1995, at 1 (Business) (discuss-
ing the Texas bill and similar legislation pending in 10 other states).
169 Sugawara, supra note 168.
170 See Gene-Detection Blues: Healthy Persons with Unhealthy Profiles Face Bias, PLaN
DEALER, Mar. 3, 1992, at 1D; Vindu P. Goel, DNA Bil DOA in '92, Has New Life, PLAIN
DEALER, Feb. 21, 1993, at 2E; Vindu P. Goel, Gene Makeup Becomes Another Insurance Battle,
PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 14, 1993, at 5B; Health Fairness, Insurance Sense, PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 20,
1992, at 6C; Sugawara, supra note 168.
171 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3901.49 (Anderson 1994).
172 CAL. INS. CODE § 10140 (Deering 1995).
173 COLO. REv. STAT. § 10-3-1104.7 (1994) (covering health, group disability, and long-
term care insurers).
174 1995 Ga. Laws 494.
175 1995 N.H. Laws 101.
176 Wis. STAT. § 631.89 (1994).
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A large number of other states are considering bans against ge-
netic discrimination by insurers, with the majority now focusing on
discrimination by health insurers.177 Brenda Trolin of the National
Conference of State Legislatures commented in 1992: 'e anticipate
even more activity in this area .... At least half the states are debating
this issue."' 78
Like race and sex discrimination, genetic discrimination is seen
as more problematic when it occurs at the underwriting stage. Media
stories have focused on specific examples of individuals being denied
insurance and on possible future discrimination in underwriting. 179
The effort by state legislatures to ban genetic discrimination by em-
ployers demonstrates a special concern with underwriting, because
employers' group insurance plans do not classify employees for the
purpose of rating and coverage decisions-once an applicant is hired
or retained (a de facto underwriting decision), genetic discrimination
ceases to be an issue. Legislators promoting anti-discrimination bills
often base their arguments on the inequity of adverse underwriting
decisions, stating, for example, that "there have been cases in Minne-
sota where people have been turned down for coverage based on ge-
netic tests, and we want that to stop."180 Sometimes the wording of
the bill reflects this preoccupation with underwriting. For example,
the Colorado statute forbids insurers to use the results of genetic tests
"for any nontherapeutic purpose" (presumably including rating, cov-
erage, and underwriting decisions) but then also specifically forbids
the use of genetic test results "for any underwriting purpose."181 Fi-
nally, states such as Arizona and Montana have passed laws specifically
forbidding discrimination only with respect to underwriting. 82
177 Bills are being considered in Florida, 1995 FL S.B. 2872; Hawaii, 1995 HI S.B. 299,
1995 HI S.B. 576, 1995 HI S.B. 1556; Indiana, 1995 IN S.B. 634; Kansas, 1995 KS H.B. 2251;
Massachusetts, 1995 MA H.B. 4485; Minnesota, 1995 MN H.B. 259, 1995 MN 278, 1995 MN
754; New York, 1995 N.Y.S.B. 4607; Oregon, 1995 OR S.B. 276; Pennsylvania, 1995 PA H.B.
1662; and Texas, 1995 TX H.B. 343.
178 Sugawara, supra note 168; see also Gorman, supra note 168, at 60 (discussing state
efforts to ban genetic discrimination); Peter N. Spotts, Ethics and the Law Ty to Keep Pace
with Genetic Testing, CHRISTLAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 14, 1995, at A3 (same).
179 See, e.g., Health Repor4 supra note 155 ("Genetic screening has already cost some
American workers their... insurance.... Unless laws are passed... the problem will only
get worse....").
180 Patricia Lopez Baden, Health Care: Panel OKs Bill to Ban Insurers from Using Genetic
Tests to Deny Coverage, STAR TRIB., Mar. 30, 1995, at 2B (quoting the sponsor of the Minne-
sota bill). The sponsors of this bill argue that it is necessary "to stop insurers from screen-
ing out people who have not even been diagnosed with a disease." Brian Cox, Minn.
Debates Bill to Prohibit Genetic Testing; NAT. UNDERWRITER, Mar. 20, 1995, at 24.
181 CoL REv. STAT. § 10-3-1104.7(2)(b) (1994).
182 ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 20448(d) (1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-18-206 (1993).
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III
FAIRNESS THEORIES
If the laws on race, sex, and genetic discrimination are "the prod-
uct of [our collective] efforts to achieve fundamental objectives,"183
we ought to be able to explain what those "fundamental objectives"
are and how they operate. They can be loosely described as "fair-
ness"-but how does fairness account for the distinction between race
and genetic discrimination on the one hand, and sex discrimination
on the other? How does it account for the emphasis on discrimina-
tion in underwriting as opposed to coverage or rating? This Part criti-
cizes the explanatory power of the two dominant perspectives on
fairness in insurance discrimination, both of which are negative rights
theories. It then proposes an alternative positive rights theory and
argues that this positive rights theory wields more explanatory power
than either of the negative rights theories.
A. The Negative Rights Theories
1. Efficient Discrimination and Anti-Discrimination
The state "unfair discrimination" statutes described in Part I.B.3
raise, but do not settle, the question of what fairness means in the
insurance classification context. This Note has labeled the two domi-
nant perspectives on this question "efficient discrimination" and "anti-
discrimination."' 8 4 According to the first perspective, "to discriminate
fairly [is] to measure as accurately as is practicable the burden shifted
to the insurance fund by the policy holder and to charge exactly for it,
no more and no less."185 According to the second perspective, dis-
crimination cannot be fair unless it is based on classifiers that are (a)
causally connected to the risk measured, (b) controllable, and (c) not
associated with historical or invidious discrimination.18 6
Both efficient discrimination and anti-discrimination are negative
rights theories.'8 7 They apply to the means by which insurers make
underwriting, coverage, or rating decisions, not to the results of those
decisions. They do not demand that any particular applicant receive
insurance, coverage for certain risks, or a certain rate. Rather, they
demand that if an individual wishes to acquire insurance and is finan-
cially able to acquire it, then the insurer must not classify him or her
in certain ways. From the efficient discrimination perspective, in-
183 See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
184 The argument that these two perspectives are dominant is Wortham's. See Wor-
tham, supra note 6, at 360. This Note uses the label "efficient discrimination" in place of
"fair discrimination." See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
185 Reverse Sex Discrimination, supra note 100, at 105.
186 See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
187 See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
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sureds have a right not to be classified for insurance purposes unless
the classification corresponds to an accurate prediction of risk. From
the anti-discrimination perspective, insureds have a right not to be
classified for insurance purposes if the classification is based on unac-
ceptable "suspect" classifiers.
Insurers and economists offer persuasive arguments in support of
the efficient discrimination perspective. 8 8 Efficient discrimination
means that classifiers accurately predict expected losses. Predictive ac-
curacy has two components: (1) separation-the degree to which in-
sureds in different risk classes have different expected losses,' 8 9 and
(2) reliability-the degree to which class membership is free of fraud
and administrative error.'9 0 According to this perspective, a classifica-
tion system that is maximally separated and maximally reliable is fair
because it requires each insured to pay a premium that approximates
as closely as possible his or her expected loss-"no more and no
less."'191
For example, suppose that statistics show a strong correlation be-
tween driver height and number of car accidents: people under 5'6"
virtually never have accidents, while people over 5'6" have, on aver-
age, three accidents per year. Assuming that height is inexpensive to
measure and difficult to fake, insurers will classify insureds by height.
The two classes of insureds (short and tall) will be highly separated
and highly reliable. Insurers will charge short people a lower pre-
mium than tall people for the same coverage. If insurers failed to use
height as a classifier, short people could claim that the system was
unfair to them: why (they would ask) should we subsidize tall people?
By charging one premium equal to the average of tall and short peo-
ple's risk, the system without height classifications would force short
people to pay both for their own expected losses and for part of the
expected losses of tall people. 192
188 See The Economics of Gender Discrimination, supra note 100, at 493-505.
189 ABRAHAM, supra note 7, at 69-71.
190 Id. at 71.
191 Reverse Sex Discrimination, supra note 100, at 105. This approach expresses fairness
in terms of rating rather than underwriting or coverage. Promoters of the efficient dis-
crimination view always use rating decisions for their examples. This may just be for the
sake of expository convenience. Their analysis arguably holds for underwriting and cover-
age as well, especially since the three decisions are interrelated. See supra note 34. But
efficient discrimination proponents' focus on rating may also stem from a desire to avoid
questions about the fairness of excluding people from the insurance market altogether.
See infra part mI.B.
192 Subsidies always exist in any insurance classification, because some insureds will
suffer larger losses than other insureds, even where their expected losses are equal. "[T]he
distinction between expected and random losses is central to the notion of efficient classifi-
cation.... Individual insureds are assessed the risk of suffering expected losses and are
charged accordingly; the risk of suffering random losses is distributed among all insureds."
ABRAHAM, supra note 7, at 77. Thus, complaints about "subsidies" are actually complaints
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Proponents of the anti-discrimination perspective put forth a dif-
ferent set of arguments. 193 They agree that insureds should pay only
for their own expected losses; they do not argue for subsidization.
However, they disagree with the efficient discrimination proponents
about the type of factors that should play a role in the calculation of
expected loss. Efficient discrimination requires the use of any classifi-
cation which increases the separability and reliability of the system.
Anti-discrimination demands that insurers use only factors that are (a)
causally connected to the risk measured, (b) controllable, and (c) not
associated with historical or invidious discrimination. 194
Anti-discrimination proponents would likely take a different view
of the auto insurance classification described above. Suppose that the
best explanation for the height-accident correspondence is that cars
are designed to fit short people, not tall people. In that case, height
does not directly cause accidents; poorly designed cars cause acci-
dents. Suppose also that height, an uncontrollable personal charac-
teristic, had been the basis for extensive societal discrimination.
Under these circumstances, the efficient discrimination analysis would
remain the same; its proponents would still argue that height classifi-
cations must be used to avoid unfair subsidization of tall people's in-
surance costs. 195 Anti-discrimination proponents, on the other hand,
would reject the use of height as a classifier, arguing that height is an
unfair classifier because it is a noncausal, uncontrollable, suspect fac-
tor. With no other risk factors to rely on, anti-discrimination propo-
nents would argue that insurers should group tall and short people
into a single classification. 196
According to the anti-discrimination view, including short and
tall people in the same risk class would not result in subsidies. 197 Sub-
sidies can be calculated only by comparing the expected losses of dif-
that expected losses (or rather, losses that could have been expected) are being distributed
as if they were random.
193 See, e.g., The Efficient Use of Group Averages as Nondiscrimination, supra note 58.
194 SeeABPRAHAM, supra note 7, at 69, 89-96. Controllability is really a subset of causality.
Controllability is also linked to efficiency because classifications based on controllable fac-
tors allow people to minimize their insurance costs by minimizing their expected loss.
195 Efficient discrimination proponents would argue that this classification is economi-
cally efficient. See ABRAHAM, supra note 7, at 77-78 (explaining that efficient classification
systems may encourage allocation of an optimal amount of resources to loss prevention,
since they allow insureds to compare loss prevention costs with the actual costs of
insurance).
196 Of course, insurers would be free to seek out other, acceptable risk factors such as
driving record or car safety features, and to construct risk classifications based on these
factors. In fact, increased efficiency may be a side effect of the anti-discrimination view,
since it forces insurers to look for causal, controllable risk factors, which insureds seeking
to minimize their insurance costs will then take steps to reduce.
197 See ABRAHAM, supra note 7, at 76; The Efficient Use of Group Averages as Nondiscrimina-
tion, supra note 58, at 234 ("Race and sex cannot be used as proxies for some other varia-
ble-such as longevity-even if it is efficient to do so.... [b]ecause sex and race are
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ferent members of the same risk class. By definition, if height is not
an acceptable risk classifier, there can be no difference in the ex-
pected losses of tall and short people; thus, ignoring height does not
mean that short people are subsidizing tall people. Unacceptable risk
classifiers are irrelevant to the calculation of expected losses in much
the same way that non-cost-effective risk classifiers198 are irrelevant. 199
For example, it is possible that an expensive, in-depth psychological
study of each insured could reliably predict each insured's risk of hav-
ing a car accident. Efficient discrimination proponents would not de-
mand that the study be used to classify insureds if the cost of the study
was greater than the value of the classifications produced; in that case,
use of the study results for classification would be unfair to all in-
sureds, since it would benefit none of them. Anti-discrimination pro-
ponents would argue that the short drivers in the scenario described
above have no more right to cry "unfair subsidization!" than the psy-
chologically low-risk drivers: in neither case can insureds demand
that insurers use "unfair" classifiers.
The efficient discrimination view rests on the intuitive unfairness
of subsidization. However, it does not rely on intuition alone to de-
fine fairness; it also equates fairness with economic efficiency.200
Charging insureds premiums that reflect their expected losses in-
creases efficiency, because it discourages insureds from purchasing in-
surance when it would be cheaper to invest in loss prevention. 20'
Efficiency gains occur even when the classifiers used are not within
the insured's control: "The insured [in that case] still has the incen-
tive to optimize his or her overall cost of protecting against risk,
through safety expenditures or reductions in activity levels, so long as
such expenditures produce greater protection than a similar invest-
ment in insurance."202
Anti-discrimination proponents challenge the equation of fair-
ness with economic efficiency on a number of grounds. Regina Aus-
tin argues that insurance classification systems reinforce social
immutable, irrelevant to distinguishing between otherwise identical individuals, and histor-
ically abused as classifiers . ").
198 Non-cost-effective classifiers are those classifiers which cost so much to measure
that their use would not give the insurer a competitive advantage. See supra notes 34-39
and accompanying text (discussing how adverse selection and competition drive insurers
to use all discoverable, cost-effective classifiers).
199 Abraham describes situations in which insurers would choose not to use non-cost-
effective classifiers. ABRAHAM, supra note 7, at 78 (" [I]t is a bit misleading to say that these
situations involve subsidies since it would be inefficient to make the investment necessary
to discover and eliminate them.").
200 See Wortham, .supra note 38, at 840 (noting that economic efficiency is a "dominant
theme" underlying the efficient discrimination perspective).
201 ABRAHAM, supra note 7, at 78.
202 Id. at 80.
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stratification.203 Classifiers such as occupation, age, sex, marital sta-
tus, student status, and territory correlate with one's position in soci-
ety as well as one's expected loss. 20 4  By preferring certain
occupations, ages, and so on, insurers reinforce social norms and hier-
archies. 20 5 Guidelines written for underwriters provide evidence sup-
porting Austin's claim. For example, one experienced underwriter
suggests that married couples with stay-at-home wives are better risks
for homeowners' insurance because in such households someone is
more likely to be home to prevent burglaries. 206 However, Austin's
complaint is not really distinguishable from the basic anti-discrimina-
tion argument. By objecting to the use of historically invidious classifi-
ers, the anti-discrimination argument also objects to classifications
that would reinforce social stratification and social injustice.
Leah Wortham argues that unregulated use of classifiers among
insurers does not actually lead to economically efficient classification
systems; market imperfections such as high transaction costs and im-
perfect information mean that competition fails to drive price to mar-
ginal cost.207 Guidelines written for underwriters contribute to the
suspicion shared by anti-discrimination proponents that underwriters'
"actuarial facts" are really just subjective opinions.208 One writer's
comments on the negative implications of homosexuality are particu-
larly revealing. He explains, "the principal reason underwriters con-
sidered sexual deviates as undesirable was that insurance acceptability
was based on the norm; situations which were abnormal presented
uncertainties which eroded the base of insurance predictability."20 9
However, neither of these concerns challenges the core of the
efficient discrimination view. Taken together, insurance market fail-
ures and insurers' subjectivity may mean that classification systems will
not reach the ideal of actuarially accurate premiums. But that does
not mean that efficient discrimination is incoherent as a theory of fair-
ness; it only means that truly efficient discrimination may be difficult
to achieve.
203 See Austin, supra note 17, at 534 (observing that "insurance 'risk' classifications cor-
relate with a fairly simplistic and static notion of social stratification").
204 Id. at 534-45.
205 Id. at 545.
206 HOLTOM, supra note 26, at 31.
207 Wortham, supra note 38; see also Wortham, supra note 6, at 381 ("[T] he illusion of a
statistical, scientific system that is a model of fairness because each pays his own way[ I is
somewhat removed from reality.").
208 SeeAustin, supra note 17, at 534 n.92 (arguing that" 'bias' plays a role in the classifi-
cation process").
209 HOLTOM, supra note 26, at 27.
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2. Initial Conflict-Why Ban Race Discrimination and Not Sex
Discrimination?
Given that efficient discrimination and anti-discrimination are
both coherent theories of fairness, fair discrimination laws might re-
flect either view. The actual state of the law should demonstrate
which of these theories we have adopted as a society, that is, it should
reveal our collective theory of fairness. But current unfair discrimina-
tion laws do not lend themselves to such a simple interpretation be-
cause they generally distinguish between race and sex discrimination.
Under efficient discrimination, both race and sex discrimination
should be allowed because both race and sex are statistically corre-
lated with risk and inexpensive to measure. 210 Under anti-discrimina-
tion, neither form of discrimination should be allowed because race
and sex are both uncontrollable, historically invidious classifiers.
Neither theory alone can explain why race discrimination is consid-
ered repugnant, while sex discrimination is so unremarkable that in-
surers include premium tables with separate "male" and "female"
columns in their advertisements.21'
Commentators on both sides of the debate have noted this incon-
sistency and have argued that the laws should be changed to eliminate
it. Wortham and other anti-discrimination proponents argue that sex,
like race, should be banned as a classifier. 212 Bailey, Benston, and
other efficient discrimination proponents argue that race, like sex,
should be a permissible classifier.213
3. Proposal-Fairness is Determined by a Merger of the Two
.Dominant Perspectives
There are many different ways to understand the apparent incon-
sistency between insurance discrimination laws and the two dominant
210 Seesuprapartsll.AB.
211 See, e.g., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1994, atA16 (An advertisement from Savings Bank Life
Insurance lists "sample low cost SBLI term insurance premiums" with separate male and
female columns. At age 60, for example, the female premium for a $100,000 policy is
$264, while the premium for males is $449.).
212 Jerry & Mansfield, supra note 79, at 333 ("[S]ociety should view gender as it now
views race ... ."); The Efficient Use of Group Averages as Nondiscrimination, supra note 58, at
234 ("Race and sex cannot be used as proxies for some other variable-such as longevity-
even if it is efficient to do so.... [b]ecause sex and race are immutable, irrelevant to
distinguishing between otherwise identical individuals, and historically abused as classifiers
... ."); Wortham, supra note 6, at 369 ("Sex should be treated like race ....").
213 Bailey et al., supra note 4, at 793 n.54 ("This approach [banning race discrimina-
tion in insurance] can be criticized on the basis of statistics reflecting that black mortality
experience is worse than that of whites.... Racially blind underwriting may, then, be
unfair discrimination."); Discrimination and Economic Efficiency, supra note 100, at 278 (As
long as invidious discrimination is not practiced, "the use of an employee's race, sex, or
age as a predictive variable would be no more or less unfair than use of that person's
educational credentials .... 1.
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theories of fairness: perhaps we should not expect laws to reflect soci-
etal views on fairness, or perhaps the laws reflect varying degrees of
political power, not varying principles.2 14 Alternatively, the dominant
theories-expressed by commentators involved in a highly polarized
debate-may simply fall to capture a societal consensus that actually
does exist.
The "real" theory of fairness-i.e., the theory that reflects our so-
cietal consensus, as expressed through the fair discrimination laws-
may be a nuanced combination, or merger, of the efficient discrimina-
tion and anti-discrimination theories. This would explain why both
sides of the debate can argue so persuasively, yet can fail to present
theories of fairness that match the fair discrimination laws. Here is an
outline of a possible merged theory of faimess:
(1) The use of a classifier is generally fair if the classifier is corre-
lated with a risk factor, i.e., if it helps to predict an insured's ex-
pected loss.
(2) Exception: A classifier with the following characteristics may
not be used, even if it is correlated with a risk factor:
(a) the classifier is highly suspect, having been the basis for
extensive societal discrimination, and
(b) the classifier does not seem to be causally connected to
the risk factor.
Part (1) corresponds to the efficient discrimination perspective; this
is the default in the merged theory. The exception in part (2) corre-
sponds to the anti-discrimination perspective, although it is not identi-
cal to this perspective. First, contrary to the anti-discrimination view,
the exception is concerned with the degree of suspectness, not simply
whether a classifier is suspect. Second, the exception is not con-
cerned with whether the classifier is immutable or controllable by the
insured, but only with whether the classifier is causally connected to
risk.
The latter distinction is subtle because control and causality are
complex and related concepts.21 5 We can probably agree that people
do not control factors such as gender, while they do control risk fac-
tors such as smoking. Between these extremes, however, lie numerous
other factors that are more difficult to characterize:2 16 what if, for
example, a person is a bad driver because his or her impoverished
circumstances did not permit the normal training and practice?
Whether a factor is controllable is not a factual question; it is a norma-
214 See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
215 See ABR.HAM, supra note 7, at 89 (noting that control and causality are at times,
"conceptually distinct notions" and at others, conceptually indistinguishable).
216 Id. at 90.
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ive conclusion about personal responsibility.2 17 This normative con-
clusion is not part of the merged theory.
The merged theory's reliance on causality could be just as prob-
lematic. Like control, causality is not a simple factual question to be
measured by scientific instruments.2 18 It is an extremely complex and
little understood subject, in science as well as in law. To the extent
that there is a statistical linkage between two things, we can assume
that causation-of some sort-is involved as well. The problem with
mere statistical linkage is that we do not know two facts: (i) the direc-
tion of the causation and (ii) the number of intervening or related
factors.2 19 Fact (ii) is the point at which causation theories become
complex: why should we ever "privilege" one of a group of statistically
linked factors? Ideology may affect our choices; for instance, do we
want to hypothesize that women's biology causes differences in their
visual-spacial abilities, or do we want to identify societal factors? The
problem is more general than the question of nature versus nurture.
Causality, like controllability, is a normative conclusion, because with-
out a framework to guide us, we have no a priori reason to pick one
factor as cause and the other as result.
However, causality can play a role in our society's theory of fair-
ness regardless of whether it is real (in some objective sense) or only
perceived, because we do share fairly consistent intuitions about cau-
sality. The merged theory recognizes classifiers as fair if they "seem
grounded in a causal explanation."220 Since the merged theory tries
to capture our perceptions about fairness, it is acceptable for percep-
tions to play a role within that theory.
4. Application to Race and Sex Discrimination
If the merged theory is an accurate description of our societal
beliefs about fairness, it should distinguish between race and sex dis-
217 Id.
218 See generaly CAR. G. HEMPEL, ASPECTS OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION AND OTHER Es-
SAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 347-54 (1965) (discussing the nature of causation);
KARL R. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DiscovERY 56-62 (1968) (same).
219 The rooster example given earlier may clarify this point. The fact that roosters
tend to crow at sunrise does not tell us whether the roosters' crowing causes the sunrise, or
the sunrise causes the roosters' crowing. Furthermore, we do not know whether there
exists some intervening factor, such as increased heat or light, which is the actual or direct
cause of the roosters' crowing. In that case we might say that the sunrise resulted in a
higher temperature or additional light, which then caused roosters to crow. Alternatively,
a related factor may be the cause, either directly or indirectly through other intervening
factors, of both the sunrise and the roosters' crowing. In that case, the statistical link be-
tween roosters' crowing and the sunrise implies the existence of causation (by the un-
known related factor) without implying either that roosters cause the sun to rise or that the
sun causes roosters to crow.
220 Wortham, supra note 6, at 380 (emphasis added) (arguing that this is enough for
legitimacy).
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crimination in insurance. Both race and sex discrimination pass part
(1) of the merged theory because they are both correlated to risk fac-
tors. Thus, if the merged theory is to explain the difference between
them, it must distinguish them under the test in part (2).
Part (2) (a) of the merged theory, which asks whether the classifi-
cation has been the basis for extensive societal discrimination, applies
differently to race and sex. Although it is hard to quantify or compare
the degree of discrimination suffered by different groups, in this soci-
ety we have concluded that race discrimination has been more exten-
sive, more harmful, and more invidious than sex discrimination.22 1
The Supreme Court's application of different levels of scrutiny to
claims of race and sex discrimination embody this conclusion. Justice
Powell states the Court's view clearly in Regents of the University of Cali-
fornia v. Bakke.2 22 "[T] he perception of racial classifications as inher-
ently odious stems from a lengthy and tragic history that gender-based
classifications do not share. [This explains why] the Court has never
viewed such classification as inherently suspect or as comparable to
racial . . . classifications for the purpose of equal protection analy-
sis."223 Federal civil rights laws reflect the same conclusion, since they
limit recovery by sex discrimination plaintiffs but not race discrimina-
tion plaintiffs. 2 24
This difference alone could explain why race discrimination is
banned while sex discrimination is allowed. But the two forms of dis-
crimination also differ under part (2) (b) of the merged theory, which
asks whether the classifier seems to be causally connected to the risk
factor. Courts that have rejected race discrimination have reasoned
that causality is required for fairness and that race does not cause the
higher risks with which it is correlated. The Supreme Court of Wis-
consin, for example, banned race discrimination in life insurance be-
cause it did not believe that race causes the mortality differences
between blacks and whites.2 25
Other courts have rejected sex discrimination because they be-
lieve that sex is not the cause of higher risk. In Hartford Accident &
221 Some feminists might well disagree, since sex discrimination has certainly been
extensive, harmful, and invidious; they might also think that comparison of suffering is not
possible, even if it were relevant. But these arguments would miss the point, because this
Part is not exploring whether the merged theory of fairness reflects everyone's views, but
only whether it reflects the majority or collective view.
222 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
223 Id. at 303; see also Freed & Polsby, supra note 100, at 615-17 (arguing that race and
sex discrimination should be treated differently because they arose in different historical
and political contexts).
224 Compare Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 102(b) (3) (imposing a ceiling on damages re-
covered under Tite VII) with 42 U.S.C. 1981 (1988) (no ceiling for damages recovered
under the Civil Rights Act of 1866).
225 Lange v. Rancher, 56 N.W.2d 542 (Wis. 1953).
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Indemnity Co. v. Insurance Commissioner,226 for example, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court upheld the state insurance commissioner's
ban on sex-based automobile insurance rates. The court stated that
"public policy considerations require more adequate justification for
rating factors than simple statistical correlation with loss; ... criteria
such as causality [should also be considered] in judging the reasona-
bleness of a classification system."227 Elaborating in a concurrence,
Justice Hutchinson concluded that
Absent at least a causal relation between sex and accident incidence
a difference in auto insurance rates between men and women is
plainly an unfair discrimination based on sex. No causal connec-
tion is shown on this record.... [The] correlation simply provides a
convenient measuring rod for setting rate differentials occasioned
by other factors not so easily identified .... 228
Hartfords holding is limited to automobile insurance. This nar-
row holding would be compatible with the merged theory of fairness
if the court believed that the differing biology of men and women
does cause other risk differences, such as the difference in mortality
rate. The distinction is plausible because physical factors do seem to
be more directly connected to mortality than to automobile accident
incidence; societal differences may well have a larger impact on the
latter. Thus, the Hartford court's narrow ban of sex discrimination in
automobile insurance provides further evidence that the merged the-
ory accurately captures our collective view of fairness. 229
Some commentators have agreed with the courts that race and
sex discrimination can be distinguished on the basis of causality. In
1961, for example, the noted insurance scholar Spencer Kimball said
that "a sound underwriting judgment" could sometimes be of "ques-
tionable validity": 230
Not all categories for which considerable statistical evidence can be
developed are in fact sound, since the defining characteristics cho-
sen may have only a partial correspondence with the true causal
factors. For example, Negroes have often been "rated up" in life
insurance, based on the undeniable fact that mortality experience
for all Negroes is less favorable than experience for all whites. It
requires little sophistication to appreciate the danger in using these
categories, for such factors as a less favorable public health environ-
ment may well bias the statistics. 23
226 482 A.2d 542 (Pa. 1984).
227 Id. at 548.
228 Id. at 550.
229 See supra note 107 for Abraham and Wortham's alternative explanations of the
narrow bans on sex discrimination in automobile insurance.
230 Kimball, supra note 32, at 496-97.
231 Id. at 496.
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Eighteen years later, Kimball was still convinced that race and sex dis-
crimination should be distinguished on the basis of causality. He ar-
gued in a 1979 article that although "race and sex are alike in some
ways, they are very different in others .... Race is only an inaccurate
surrogate for the true factors, and has no demonstrable effect in it-
self.... For sex, however, there seems to be clear genetic or biologi-
cal differences in mortality .... 2 32
Insurers have also argued for the merged theory of fairness. One
insurance association explained in 1974 that the distinction between
race and sex discrimination is appropriate because "racial differences
in claim costs are actually a reflection of socio-economic differences,
whereas gender differences cut across socio-economic classes."233 In
response to pressure from anti-discrimination proponents in the early
1980s, insurers "respond[ed] by saying that race and religion, in fact,
are proxies. Blacks do not have shorter life expectancies... because
they are black. Shorter life expectancy is associated with poverty, and
proportionately more blacks than whites are poor."234
According to the merged theory of fairness, we find the use of a
classifier fair if it is correlated with a risk factor, unless the classifier is
highly suspect and seems causally unrelated to the risk factor. This
theory can account for the distinction between race and sex discrimi-
nation in state unfair discrimination laws because although both race
and sex are correlated with risk factors, race is considered more invidi-
ous and seems less causally related to risk factors.235 The narrow bans
on sex discrimination in automobile insurance provide further sup-
port for this explanation, because legislatures have imposed such bans
in response to the suspicion that sex differences, while they may cause
differences in mortality, do not directly cause differences in accident
incidence.
232 Reverse Sex Discrimination, supra note 100, at 111-13.
233 Sydlaske, supra note 99, at 1391 (citing statements made by life insurance associa-
tion to the New York Assembly Standing Committee on Insurance, Mar. 6, 1974).
234 CADDY, supra note 101, at 105.
235 While the arguments of some commentators might seem to undermine the merged
theory's explanatory value, they do not undermine the theory's explanatory value very
much. Wortham argues that sex is not a good predictor of mortality because the relation-
ship between sex and mortality has changed over time. Wortham, supra note 6, at 374
n.126. Brilmayer also argues that sex is not as good a predictor as others seem to think it
is. The Efficient Use of Group Averages as Nondiscrimination, supra note 58, at 236, 239-47.
These arguments are hotiy contested. See, e.g. Discrimination and Economic Effiency, supra
note 100 (Benston's second response to Brilmayer et al.'s argument). But even if it could
be proven that sex is no more causal than race, this would not necessarily undermine the
merged theory: what is important is what people think is true, not what is true.
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5. Problem-The Merged Theory Cannot Account for Genetic
Discrimination Bans
If race and sex discrimination were the only forms of discrimina-
tion at issue, it would be reasonable to assume that the merged theory
represents our societal consensus on fairness. However, the merged
theory does not explain the bans on genetic discrimination. In fact,
the merged theory predicts just the opposite public reaction to ge-
netic discrimination than that which has occurred.
Public outcry over genetic discrimination has invoked the rheto-
ric of anti-discrimination: ninety percent of Americans now think that
genetic discrimination is unfair236 because "innate, unalterable differ-
ences should not be the basis for [insurance] discrimination,"237 and
editorials discussing new legislation congratulate the sponsors for
"rightly view[ing] the anti-genetic-bias requirement as a matter of ba-
sic equity."238 By contrast, a recent OTA survey found that "[ilnsurers
generally believed that it was fair for them to use genetic tests to iden-
tify those at increased risk of disease [because] genetic information is
not viewed as a special type of information. What seems important to
insurers when making insurability and rating decisions is the particu-
lar condition, not that the condition is genetically based."239 Insurers
believe that they should be able to classify applicants based on their
genetic risk, like any other risk factor; this, they argue, is fair discrimi-
nation.240 Thus far, legislators have been listening more closely to the
public outcry against genetic discrimination than to the insurance
lobby.241
In order to account for this outcome, the merged theory would
need to find genetic discrimination unfair. Genetic discrimination,
like race and sex discrimination, does not fail part (1) of the merged
theory242 because genetic factors are correlated with greater risk. Ge-
netic discrimination actually passes part (1) more easily than race or
sex discrimination because the statistical correlation between genes
and disease can be very strong-up to 100%-and because correla-
tions can be pinpointed with great certainty.243
Thus, if the merged theory has any explanatory power, genetic
discrimination must fail part (2) of the merged theory. But in fact
genetic discrimination passes parts (2) (a) and (2) (b) more easily than
236 See Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 134, at 48 (citing 1994 TIME/CNN poll results).
237 Lowe, supra note 142, at 510 (citing results from a 1989 insurance industry study of
public attitudes about genetic discrimination).
238 Health Fairness, Insurance Sense supra note 155.
239 ASSESSING GENsnrc RisKs, supra note 131, at 269-70.
240 See id. (discussing insurer reactions); Kevies & Hood, supra note 155 (same).
241 See supra part II.C (discussing legislation).
242 See supra part IHA.3.
243 See supra notes 119-39 and accompanying text.
1995] 1685
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
either race or sex discrimination. Genetic factors could not be the
basis for invidious historical discrimination under part (2) (a), as race
has been, because the first gene was identified only about twenty years
ago.2 44
Of course, scientists and the general public have understood for
many years that disease can be inherited through some mechanism.
But a susceptibility to inherited disease is not the factor at issue in the
fairness debate. The public outcry has not been against classifying in-
dividuals based on their general susceptibility to inherited illness, as
determined through a family medical history, but rather against classi-
fying individuals based on the results of a laboratory genetic test 2 45
The state laws reflect this specific concern by banning insurers' use of
genetic tests while continuing to permit the use of family medical his-
tories.2 46 If a susceptibility to inherited disease were the factor at is-
sue, it might be reasonable to conclude that it is seen as highly
suspect247 (although some might question why it is seen as more sus-
pect than sex). But genetic factors-the factors at issue in the fairness
debate-cannot possibly be "highly suspect" classifiers, because it is
only very recently that we have been able to classify people by their
genes.
Genetic factors pass part (2) (b) of the merged theory just as eas-
ily, because they are definitely causally connected to the risk factor
(disease). In this context we do not need intuition to determine the
causal connection, because we know the basic mechanism: faulty
genes make faulty proteins, which result in a disease or heightened
susceptibility to a disease.2 48
Despite this failure to explain genetic discrimination bans, the
merged theory might still have some explanatory value. Although the
merged theory finds that genetic discrimination is more fair than
either race or sex discrimination, there may be other reasons for re-
jecting genetic discrimination which override this result. In fact, a
244 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
245 See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
246 See supra notes 165-77 and accompanying text. The Ohio law is particularly instruc-
tive in this context. Although the legislature considered a broad ban on insurers' use of
"hereditary" information (from genetic tests or from medical history questionnaires), the
law the legislature actually passed, like the laws in other states, only bans the use of genetic
test results. See supra notes 170-71.
247 See, as an example of historical discrimination against those with inherited disease,
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (Holmes, J.) (upholding constitutionality of en-
forced sterilization scheme with the comment that "[t]hree generations of imbeciles is
enough").
248 See generally BAsKiN, supra note 130, at 48-80 (describing the connections between
genes and disease); Billings, supra note 113, at 39-75 (describing basic research into gene
functions).
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number of possible reasons do exist However, none of them is strong
enough to explain why we consider genetic discrimination unfair.
One possibility is that the bans are designed to restrain insurers
who might react irrationally to genetic information. The gene re-
searchers, at least, do not seem to have much confidence in insurers'
proper use of genetic information. 249 Insurers may not deserve much
confidence, given that they have reacted irrationally in the past: insur-
ers have been known to deny coverage to an individual because he or
she carries a single copy of the gene for sickle cell anemia or Gaucher
disease, even though such a carrier has zero risk of developing these
diseases. 250 But concern with irrational behavior cannot explain the
genetic discrimination bans that have been under consideration, be-
cause these bans do not merely enforce "rational" or efficient discrim-
ination-they ban discrimination even when a genetic factor is
correlated with a higher risk of disease.
Another possibility is that genetic discrimination is being banned
because practicing genetic discrimination could be an indirect way to
practice race discrimination, which the merged theory of fairness for-
bids.251 Certain genetic diseases such as sickle cell anemia and Tay
Sachs disease do occur largely in one racial group.252 However, this
concern would not explain why legislatures are passing broad bans,
not limited to "suspect diseases."
A third possibility is that the bans are meant to prevent health
insurers from excessive profit-taking. Health insurers claim that bans
on genetic discrimination will hurt them, because such bans will lead
to an adverse selection spiral.2 3 But this is unlikely to happen, be-
cause low risk insureds cannot leave the insurance market without for-
going health care.254 The insurers' real desire may be short term
profit-taking: if they can cut the highest risk people without lowering
rates, they will make a much larger profit (since five percent of health
insureds account for approximately fifty percent of costs25 5). Insurers
could continue to make this excessive profit until competition with
other insurers drove rates down to marginal cost again. This process
might take quite a while given existing market failures. 256
249 See Dennis S. Karjala, A Legal Research Agenda for the Human Genome Initiative, 32
JulumErmcs J. 121, 173 (1992) (expressing doubts about insurers' ability to use genetic
information correctly).
250 Gostin, supra note 154, at 118.
251 Id. at 110-12.
252 Id. at Ill.
253 See supra part IA (discussing how adverse selection can hurt employers).
254 See Lowe, supra note 142, at 520.
255 Rothstein, supra note 128, at 14-15.
256 See Wortham, supra note 38, at 859-84 (describing market failures).
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Although this possibility is significant, it also fails to explain the
public and legislative reaction to genetic discrimination. If excessive
profit taking were the real concern, one would expect that the debate
over genetic discrimination would focus on this problem. Instead, the
concerned public and legislators promoting genetic discrimination
bans never mention insurers' profits, only the inequity to individuals
of genetic classification. A related possibility, that genetic discrimina-
tion bans are designed to avoid the externalities caused when people
do not have health insurance, 257 is similarly unsupported by the pub-
lic outcry. Neither insurer profits nor externalities explain the vehe-
mence or focus of the attacks on genetic discrimination.
6. Summary
Negative rights theories cannot explain current insurance dis-
crimination laws. Because the efficient discrimination theory and the
anti-discrimination theory explain fairness by defining "fair classifi-
ers," they cannot explain the focus in unfair discrimination laws on
underwriting; according to the negative rights theories, it is only the
nature of the classifier that counts, not the purpose for which it is
used.
Furthermore, negative rights theories cannot explain why current
unfair discrimination laws distinguish between race and sex discrimi-
nation. Efficient discrimination would allow both race and sex classifi-
ers, and anti-discrimination would forbid both. A merged theory can
account for the distinction between race and sex discrimination, but it
fails to explain why genetic discrimination is unfair. In fact, the
merged theory finds genetic factors to be ideal classifiers-quite the
opposite of our collective judgment. Although additional reasons for
banning genetic discrimination exist, none of them is strong enough
to overcome the merged theory's acceptance of genetic
discrimination.
B. A Positive Rights Theory of Fair Discrimination
1. From Negative Rights to Positive Rights
Negative rights, which "require nothing of the state or other citi-
zens except forbearance," 258 pervade our culture. One scholar has
noted approvingly that these are "Bill of Rights values,"259 and the
257 See id. at 875.
258 Charles M. Freeland, Note, The Political Process as Final Solution, 68 IND. LJ. 525, 535
(1993).
259 Id.
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courts have generally agreed that the Constitution guarantees only
negative rights.2 60
The dominance of negative rights may be diminishing, however.
Several authors have recently argued that recognition of positive
rights by international law will lead to recognition of positive rights
within the United States.261 There is already widespread public sup-
port for entitlement programs such as Medicare, Food Stamps, and
Social Security.2 62 Commentators argue that we should recognize a
constitutional right to equality of educational opportunity263 and a
right to minimal subsistence. 264 Current insurance discrimination law
provides evidence that we are beginning to accept a positive right to
certain other social goods as well.
2. Proposal: A Positive Rights Theory of Fairness
More than thirty years ago Spencer Kimball noted that the pur-
pose of insurance regulation seemed to be shifting toward socializa-
tion of risk:
If socialization of risk is viewed as an objective of insurance regula-
tion, it at once alters the basic focus of the enterprise from one
essentially private (albeit subject to control in the public interest) to
one which is essentially public, permitted to exist in private form
only to the extent that it fulfills society's demands. Despite all our
predilections to the contrary, it seems a fact that the basic focus of
the enterprise is changing-subtly and gradually, but inexorably-
and the new and pervasive demands of society are becoming more
influential.265
Kimball offered the adoption of mandatory automobile insurance,
and the subsequent requirement that insurers share the burden of
insuring high risk drivers as part of an assigned risk plan, as an exam-
260 See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989)
(Rehnquist, CJ.) ("[T]he Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to gov-
ernmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property
interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual."); Jackson v. City
ofJoliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983) (PosnerJ.) ("[T]he Constitution is a charter
of negative rather than positive liberties."), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984).
261 Gerard Quinn, Civil Commitment and the Right to Treatment Under the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights, 5 HAiv. HuM. R-s.J. 1 (1992); Barbara Stark, Economic Rights in the
United States and International Human Rights Law: Toward an "Entirely New Strategy," 44 HAS-
TINGs LJ. 79 (1992).
262 See THEODORE R. MARMOR ET AL., AMERICA'S MISUNDERSTOOD WELFARE STATE: PER-
s=SmrrNT MYTHS, ENDURING REALITIES 47, 48 (1990) (citing surveys).
263 Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Education under the U.S. Con-
stitution: A Beginning to the End of the National Education Crisis, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 550 (1992);
Donald P.Judges, Bayonets for the Wounded: Constitutional Paradigms and Disadvantaged Neigh-
borhoods, 19 HASTINGS CONSr. L.Q. 599 (1992).
264 Judges, supra note 261, at 660.
265 Kimball, supra note 32, at 513.
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ple of this shift.266 In 1977 the Michigan Commissioner of Insurance
issued a report that defined certain types of insurance, including auto-
mobile insurance, as "essential"267 and then recognized "a guaranteed
right to essential insurance."268
Despite these early voices acknowledging the possibility of a right
to insurance, Leah Wortham argued in 1986 that the debate over clas-
sification lacked "an appreciation that insurance is a necessity for
most Americans."269 In other words, the debate over classification has
ignored the possibility of a positive right to insurance. This should
not be surprising. The "overlooked perspective" 270 is necessarily over-
looked under the two "dominant perspectives" 271 -efficient discrimi-
nation and anti-discrimination-because they are both negative rights
theories.
However, as Part III.A demonstrated, the label "dominant" might
be misleading here. Neither efficient discrimination, anti-discrimina-
tion, nor a merger of the two can account for the current unfair dis-
crimination laws. Negative rights theories are dominant, but only as
rhetoric. The positive rights theory is not overlooked; it is simply un-
deracknowledged. The "real" theory of fairness in insurance classifi-
cation, the one which captures our collective judgments about the
fairness of race, sex, and genetic discrimination, does not overlook
the fact that certain forms of insurance are essential. Under the "real"
theory, a positive rights theory, this fact is central.
Positive rights flow from a theory of distributive justice. It is
outside the scope of this Note to propose such a theory. For the pur-
pose of the Note, it is only necessary to point out that coherent theo-
ries of distributive justice are possible. Norman Daniels's theory
serves as an example. He has outlined a distributive justice theory that
includes a positive right to health care.272 Justice exists, according to
Daniels, if everyone has access to enough health care to allow them
"normal species functioning."273 In economic terms, health care is an
"opportunity good."274 Under Daniels's theory, it is a moral right as
266 Id. at 514.
267 INSURANCE BUREAU, MICH. DEr. OF COMMERCE, ESSENTIAL INSURANCE IN MICHIGAN:
AN AVOIDABLE CRISIS 3-4 (1977).
268 Id. at 56.
269 Wortham, supra note 6, at 350.
270 Id.
271 Id.
272 Norman Daniels, Health-Care Needs and DistributiveJustice, 10 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 146,
160-74 (1981) [hereinafter Health Care Needs and Distributive Justice]; see also Allen E.
Buchanan, The Right to a Minimum of Decent Health Care 13 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 55, 62-66
(1984) (disputing certain points in Daniels' theory); Norman Daniels, Fair Equality of Op-
portunity and Decent Minimums: A Reply to Buchanan, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 106 (1985) (de-
fending the theory).
273 Health Care Needs and Distributive Justice, supra note 272, at 160.
274 Karjala, supra note 249, at 173.
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well because a positive right to health care is used to guarantee equal-
ity of opportunity. 275
This positive rights theory-that people have a right to certain
forms of insurance or to the benefits that insurance provides-need
not replace the merged theory described in Part III.A. Rather, it
could add an initial step to the merged theory:
(0) An insurance classification system (in its entirety) is not fair if
it results in the denial of a positive right, including, for example, a
positive right to health care.
(1) Otherwise, the use of a classifier is fair if the classifier is corre-
lated with a risk factor, i.e., if it helps to predict an insured's ex-
pected loss.
(2) Exception: if a classifier has the following characteristics, it
may not be used, even if it is correlated with a risk factor:
(a) the classifier is highly suspect, having been the basis for
extensive societal discrimination, and
(b) the classifier-does not seem to be causally connected to
the risk factor.
This theory combines both positive and negative rights. To distin-
guish it from the merged theory presented in Part III.A.3, it can be
labeled the "mixed" theory.
3. Application to Race, Sex, and Genetic Discrimination
The mixed theory can give a better account of current unfair dis-
crimination laws than any of the negative rights theories-efficient
discrimination, anti-discrimination, or a merger of the two-provide.
It can explain, not only the overall pattern of unfair discrimination
laws, but also the details that the negative rights theories have to label
"oddities."276
The mixed theory, like the merged theory, would forbid race dis-
crimnation under the anti-discrimination exception in part (2). But
the mixed theory can also explain why a ban on race classifications is
not sufficient: it explains why the federal government enacted the
Fair Access to Insurance Requirements (FAIR) program in response
insurers' redlining practice 277 (permitted under the merged theory
because redlining does not depend on racial classifiers). If we believe
that individuals have a positive, moral right to have access to property
or business insurance in order to participate fully in society, we cannot
consider insurance practices fair when they deny individuals this right.
The mixed theory also accounts for the laws concerning sex dis-
crimination in insurance. Sex discrimination in rating passes part (0)
275 Health Care Needs and DisributiveJustice supra note 272, at 160.
276 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
277 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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of the mixed theory because differential rates have not excluded wo-
men from the insurance market altogether. Where sex discrimination
in coverage or underwriting has excluded women from the insurance
market, and thus from some essential societal benefits, states have for-
bidden sex discrimination.2 78
Finally, the mixed theory accounts for the greatest puzzle in in-
surance discrimination laws thus far: the rush to ban genetic discrimi-
nation, particularly in the health insurance context. Genetic
discrimination strikes us as unfair, not because there is anything ille-
gitimate about genetic classification per se, but because an insurance
system that uses genetic classifications can deny individuals access to
health care-something to which they have a positive right. Such dis-
crimination fails part (0) of the mixed theory. When genetic classifi-
cation is used to deny access to less essential forms of insurance, such
as life insurance, we do not find it as offensive-this type of genetic
classification passes parts (0), (1), and (2) of the mixed theory. The
greater emphasis on genetic discrimination in underwriting also fol-
lows from part (0) of the mixed theory, since underwriting decisions
are more likely than coverage or rating decisions to deny access to a
positive right.
IV
IMPLICATIONS
The mixed positive rights/negative rights theory can explain why
states are rushing to ban genetic discrimination. But if we rely on this
theory to explain why we choose to ban genetic discrimination, then
we must acknowledge that banning genetic discrimination in insur-
ance is not enough. Recent census data showed that 37 million peo-
ple in the United States have no access to health care, and that an
additional 189 million have only limited access.2 79 Because banning
genetic discrimination in insurance does nothing to aid these people,
it is hypocritical to argue that a collective belief in a positive right to
health care requires us to ban genetic discrimination.
The word "hypocrisy" is appropriate here because the bans on
genetic discrimination are not merely underinclusive. They are un-
derinclusive in a particular direction: bans on genetic discrimination
provide a benefit to those members of society who are in a position to
make their concerns heard by the media and state legislatures, while
failing to provide a benefit to the more invisible members of society.
In effect, the proponents of genetic discrimination bans are arguing,
278 See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text (Sex discrimination lawsuits have
focused on underwriting and coverage rather than rating; state laws and regulations like-
wise restrict the use of sex discrimination in underwriting and coverage but not rating.).
279 OTA STUDY, supra note 142, at 161 (citing Census Bureau figures).
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"there exists a positive right to health care, but it applies only to me
(and people like me)." The use of negative rights rhetoric both re-
flects and reinforces this attitude, while disguising its intrinsic
hypocrisy.
The use of negative rights rhetoric leads to a more immediate
failure as well: the narrow bans on genetic discrimination inspired by
negative rights rhetoric will not even help many of the people they
were designed to assist.280 Because the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) 28 1 exempts self-insured plans from state
regulation, sixty percent of all covered workers are currently under
self-insurance plans, and increasing numbers of employers are self-in-
suring.2 82 Thus, the genetic discrimination bans are misguided even
at their core: a state ban on genetic discrimination in insurance can-
not hope to protect the large percentage of individuals who receive
insurance from a provider whom the state does not regulate.2 83
Laws banning genetic discrimination simply fail to make the in-
surance system more fair. If we limit ourselves to negative rights theo-
ries of fairness, we must acknowledge that genetic factors are
acceptable-even ideal-classifiers. If we rely instead on a positive
rights theory to explain why we wish to ban genetic discrimination,
then we must acknowledge that banning genetic discrimination in in-
surance is an inadequate way to create a fairer society. To avoid hy-
pocrisy under a positive rights theory of fairness, we must ensure that
the benefits of insurance are extended to all.
CONCLUSION
As Lucinda Finley noted in a similar context, "[t]he limits of our
reform imaginations are usually defined by the search to extend more
rights to more people. As long as the concept of rights remains based
on the value of noninterference. .. we can travel only so far in re-
280 See Myk Cherskou, Fighting Genetic Discrimination: Lawyer, denied insurance on basis of
father's disease, backs protective laws, ABA J., June 1992, at 38 (complaining about genetic
discrimination yet arguing for a narrow ban that would not have protected her).
281 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1145 (Supp. V 1993).
282 See Miller, supra note 17, at 744.
283 Kenneth Abraham also notes that narrow bans on certain types of classifiers seem
to have more appeal than their actual effectiveness merits. He suggests that "[t]hese ad
hoc methods of risk distribution may be inefficient, subject to circumvention by the mar-
ket, and only partially effective. But they have the virtue, at least for proponents of risk-
redistribution, of being possible to implemen. More than anything else, this may explain
their attractiveness." ABRAHAM, supra note 7, at 100 (emphasis added). However, if we
consider carefully just how ineffective genetic discrimination bans are, they may become
less attractive to us. Once we acknowledge the true hypocrisy and ineffectiveness of ban-
ning genetic discrimination, we may become willing to attempt a more difficult but effec-
tive solution: designing a national health care system.
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structuring institutions."28 4 In the context of insurance discrimina-
tion, our imagination has been constrained by our negative rights
rhetoric. We have attempted to make our society more fair by ex-
tending more and more negative rights, gene by gene, classifier by
classifier. This approach will never work, because it is fundamentally
incompatible with the demands of our collective conscience. To suc-
cessfully reform our society, to make it as fair as we want it to be, we
must transcend the boundaries of our negative rights rhetoric.
Jill Gauldingt
284 Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theoy: A Way Out of the Maternity and the
Workplace Debate, 86 COLuM. L. REv. 1118, 1161-62 (1986).
t The author would like to thank Linda Mangel of the Northwest Women's Law
Center for introducing her to the question of sex discrimination in insurance, and the
members of the Cornell Law Review staff, especially Shana Solomon, for their hard work and
many helpful suggestions.
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